Rayford Homes granted security to two lenders, its trustee shareholder and the Bank of Scotland (BoS). The parties entered into an intercreditor agreement (ICA) using the BoS standard form. In a schedule to that agreement was a definition of the term ‘BoS Priority’ over ‘BoS Debt’ up to a monetary limit. The amount was not filled in, nor was the term ‘BoS priority’ actually used in the ICA.

In 2002 a European subsidiary of Lehman Brothers created a complicated synthetic debt structure called Dante, which was intended to provide credit insurance for another subsidiary, LBSF, against credit events affecting certain reference entities, the obligations of which formed the reference portfolio. A special purpose vehicle issued notes to investors, the proceeds of which were used to purchase collateral which vested in a trust. The issuer entered into a swap with LBSF under which LBSF received the income on the collateral and paid the issuer the amount of interest due to noteholders.

The Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada on October 24, 2008. The decision provides welcome clarification concerning the nature of government licenses and confirms that at least certain kinds of licenses constitute property for the purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and for the purposes of Canadian personal property security legislation. The decision is also important because it takes a purposive and commercial approach to the interpretation of bankruptcy and personal property security legislation.

From July 21, the reform of rules on prospectuses, intended to establish a common rulebook across the EU to encourage financing through capital markets, will directly apply in Spain.

On May 10th, FDIC Acting Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg discussed the FDIC's authority to resolve failing systemically important financial institutions ("SIFIs"). Gruenberg outlined how the FDIC would implement its resolution authority, noting that it would place the institution in receivership, creating a bridge holding company for the SIFI's assets and investments. Shareholders and subordinated and unsecured creditors would be left in receivership, although some of the SIFI's debt would be converted into equity.

FDIC Proposes Rules for the Recoupment of Compensation from Executives of Failed Financial Institutions I hope this does not apply to any of you, but on Tuesday, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) approved a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) to clarify application of the orderly liquidation authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, "Orderly Liquidation Authority" (OLA).

The Senate Banking Committee is considering the establishment of a special bankruptcy court for financial firms as part of its regulatory reform measures. Bankruptcy.

On April 30th, the FDIC issued a final rule that treats a mutual insurance holding company as an insurance company for purposes of Section 203(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act. The new rule clarifies that the liquidation and rehabilitation of a covered financial company that is a mutual insurance holding company will be conducted in the same manner as an insurance company.

On December 23rd, the Third Circuit addressed whether the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code prevents a home mortgage lender from accounting for the pre-petition escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of future monthly escrow payments. The Court concluded that when the terms of the loan allow the lender to escrow taxes and insurance payments, the lender has a pre-petition claim. In re Francisco Rodriguez.  

On November 12th, the Third Circuit affirmed both bankruptcy and district court findings that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a claim seeking rescission of a mortgage filed in an adversarial action in federal bankruptcy court after a state court entered a default foreclosure order on that mortgage. The Third Circuit held further that the entry of summary judgment against plaintiff on her Truth in Lending Act claim was proper.