Essentially all securitization structures utilize a bankruptcy remote entity, a/k/a special purpose entity (“SPE”), to reduce the lenders’ or investors’ exposure to a bankruptcy of the sponsor. A standard feature of SPEs is the appointment of an independent person (director, member, manager) to the body managing the SPEs. That independent person’s consent is required for “major decisions,” one of which is the filing of, or consenting to a bankruptcy of the SPE (hence the court’s reference to them as “blocking directors”).
Our October 2010 DechertOnPoint “FDIC Begins Action on Its Super-Resolution Rules for Covered Financial Companies” discussed how systemi-cally significant non-bank financial companies (“covered financial compa-nies”) may find themselves in unknown territory if the FDIC is appointed re-ceiver for them.
You know, there’s never a dull moment when one reports on the regulatory states’ endless and so often fruitless and wrong-headed tinkering with the global economy. So now… let’s talk bail-in.
Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.
SEC and FDIC Propose Dodd-Frank Broker-Dealer Resolution Rules
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new non-judicial receivership al-ternative for resolving troubled financial companies that could threaten the stability of the U.S. financial system (“Covered Financial Companies”), as described further below. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), on October 12, 2010, issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (the “Proposal”) to begin to implement the provisions of Title II.
Part I -- Introduction
Two recent court decisions may affect an equity sponsor’s options when deciding whether and how to put money into - or take money out of - a portfolio company. The first may expand the scope of “inequitable conduct” that, in certain Chapter 11 settings, could lead a court to equitably subordinate a loan made by a sponsor to its portfolio company, placing the loan behind all of the company’s other debt in the payment queue. The second decision muddies the waters of precedent under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on the issue of the avoidability of non-U.S.
The next few years will see the “redevelopment” of the law in two critical areas involving bank failures where the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-tion (“FDIC”) is appointed receiver: (i) the relative rights and claims of creditors of a bank or savings and loan holding company, including the FDIC; and (ii) D&O and professional liability. Significant decisions are be-ginning to be issued with regard to the former.
Merit Management