In what it described as “an easy decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court issued its eagerly anticipated decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v. Amalgamated Bank1 on May 29, 2012.
Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a debtor cannot confirm a Chapter 11 “cramdown” plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a secured creditor’s lien when it denies the secured creditor’s right to credit bid at the auction. This should be welcome news to members of the secured lending community because guaranteeing the right of secured creditors to credit bid will reduce the risk of making such loans.
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In Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in which the Bankruptcy Court avoided the liens given by TOUSA’s subsidiaries to new lenders and permitted the recovery of the proceeds of the new loan from other TOUSA lenders that had taken the funds in repayment of their TOUSA guaranteed loans.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its much anticipated decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy cases on May 15, 2012. The decision provides an ominous reminder to Lenders to carefully assess the value of accepting asset pledges or guarantees from borrowers’ subsidiaries, sometimes referred to as upstream guarantees.
Today, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its much awaited decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ______ (2012). The noteworthy decision resolves any uncertainty surrounding a secured creditor’s right to credit bid in a sale under a chapter 11 plan which arose after cases like Philadelphia Newspapers 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) curtailed the right.
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that debtors may not obtain confirmation of a Chapter 11 cramdown plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of a creditor’s lien but does not permit the creditor to credit-bid at the sale. InRadlax Gateway Hotel, LLC et al. v.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently issued an important decision on the valuation of collateral of secured creditors and “lien-stripping” in Chapter 11 cases. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc.,1 the court held that in a Chapter 11 case, the value of a secured creditor’s collateral under §506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code2 was the fair market value of the property as established by expert testimony and it was permissible to “strip the lien” of the creditor where it was unsupported by collateral value.
The outcome of the TOUSA appeal has been much anticipated and closely watched by the lending community, their counsel and advisors, and legal scholars. On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion (found here), reversing the District Court for the Southern District of Florida and affirming the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, at least insofar as to the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, but not remedies.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on May 15, 2012, reversed a district court's February 2011 decision that lenders were not liable on a fraudulent transfer claim. In re TOUSA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 (11th Cir. 5/15/12).[1] It rejected the district court's finding that corporate subsidiaries had received "reasonably equivalent value" when they encumbered their assets to secure a loan made to them and their corporate parent.
In In re Crane, the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois recently held that a mortgage can be avoided in bankruptcy if it fails to include the maturity date and the interest rate of the underlying debt within the mortgage document. The court found that failing to include these loan terms on the face of the mortgage as recorded, violated the requirements of Illinois conveyancing statutes, and therefore did not provide the constructive notice to the trustee necessary for preventing the avoidance.