Recently, in Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. (“Caesars”), U.S. Bankruptcy Judge A. Benjamin Goldgar denied payment of indenture trustee Wilmington Trust’s attorneys’ fees and costs in connection with the Debtors’ motion to approve a settlement. The U.S. Trustee objected to payment arguing that the Debtor could not rely on 11 U.S.C. § 363 (seeking settlement approval) as authority to pay Wilmington Trust’s fees and costs. Sustaining the U.S.
Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits action that would deprive individual bondholders of the right to receive principal and interest, has taken center stage of late with rulings on the scope of its applicability. But another provision of Section 316 of the TIA drives in the opposite direction, and is equally fundamental to the architecture of indenture debt as commonly issued in this country. Section 316(a)(1) prescribes the default rule that a majority of bondholders have the power to direct the remedial actions of the trustee.
The Bankruptcy Code grants a trustee (or a debtor in possession) certain “avoidance” powers to recover payments to creditors made shortly before a bankruptcy filing where the payment gave the creditor more than other, similarly situated, creditors would receive through the bankruptcy process.
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) was passed by Congress in 1930 to protect agricultural produce suppliers from unscrupulous vendors who refused to pay the suppliers for their goods.
Circuit held that when a chapter 11 debtor cures a default under its loan agreements, the debtor is required to pay default interest as required by the loan documents, rather than at the non-default rate.
Copyrighting their names, “signing” with red thumbprints – we’ve seen some unusual court filings from unique individuals. But one person has apparently gone too far.
It can be incredibly frustrating for a lender when a borrower defaults on a loan and asserts frivolous defenses in response. A group of individuals who call themselves “sovereign citizens” or “sovereign freemen” often makes lawsuits quite tedious by refusing to recognize the authority of the courts or the government, or claiming that the loan is invalid because it is based on “vapor money.”
The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims, holding that the defendant’s conduct—filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts—does not violate the FDCPA. SeeIn re Dubois, 2016 WL4474156 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016). In the case, each of the two plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the defendant filed proofs of claim in the plaintiffs’ cases.
In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division recently ruled that debtors’ FCCPA and TCPA claims did not arise out of and were not related to their mortgage to fall under the jury waiver provisions in the mortgage where the claims arose out of attempts to enforce a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy.
The Court also ruled the debtors sufficiently stated a claim under FCCPA by alleging the creditor received notice of the debtors’ bankruptcy case to constitute actual knowledge the debtors’ were represented by counsel.
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case Bash v.