The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently held that a bank’s lawsuit against the husband of a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy did not violate the co-debtor stay because the husband’s credit card debts were not a consumer debt for which the debtor was personally liable.

Recent changes to New York’s foreclosure statutory scheme are set to go into effect on December 20, 2016. These wide-ranging revisions include the following amendments:

(Bankr. W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2016)

Fans of Star Trek: The Next Generation will well-remember that a constant threat to the crew of the Starship Enterprise was The Borg, a multi-species civilization that operated as a collective consciousness, with all individuality extinguished. When confronting any other civilization, The Borg Collective always announced: “We are the Borg. Your biological and technological distinctiveness will be added to our own. Resistance is futile.”

On November 21, 2016, in a case entitled In re Monson,1 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision,2 which held that a debtor's conduct constituted a willful and malicious injury to a creditor within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), because the debtor injured the creditor's right to recover its loan, the injury was intended, and the debtor was conscious of his wrongdoing. Thus, the debt was nondischargeable under 523(a)(6).

Exceptions to the Dischargeability of Debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code

An undersecured mortgagee’s “release of [its entire underlying claim] was value obtained ‘in exchange for’ the [pre-bankruptcy] sale of the [debtor’s] property,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Dec. 6, 2016. In re Expert South Tulsa LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21704, at *11 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016). The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the debtor’s attempt “to set aside as a fraudulent transfer its own sale of real estate that was encumbered by a mortgage far exceeding the sale price.” Id. at *1.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently rejected a bankruptcy trustee’s effort to avoid a mortgage on the basis that the acknowledgment signed by the borrowers’ attorney-in-fact was defective under Massachusetts law, holding that the acknowledgment was not materially defective because as a matter of agency law the attorney-in-fact’s signature was the borrowers’ “free act and deed.”

In a recent case arising out of the bankruptcy of the Yellowstone Mountain Club, a private ski club for the ultrawealthy, Blixseth v. Brown (In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC) (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff needed the bankruptcy court’s permission to bring post-petition claims against the chair of Yellowstone’s Unsecured Creditors Committee (“UCC”).

The receipt of make-whole premiums, including during a bankruptcy after acceleration of the notes, is of paramount importance to noteholders. Decisions in some recent cases in New York and Delaware bankruptcy and federal district courts have held that note purchase agreements or indentures must include an express agreement that the make-whole premium (or similar prepayment premium) is payable upon acceleration (rather than prepayment) after the filing of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the recent Momentive decision (In re MPM Silicones, LLC), for example, the U.S.

Judge Carey in the District of Delaware recently ruled on an intriguing question—can a defendant in a preference action reduce the amount of a recoverable preference by setting off the value of an allowed administrative expense claim?. Though not late-breaking news, this case provides a thorough examination of the essential character of administrative expense claims.