© 2011 Bloomberg Finance L.P. All rights reserved. Originally published by Bloomberg Finance L.P. in the Vol. 5, No. 13 edition of the Bloomberg Law Reports—Bankruptcy Law. Reprinted with permission. Bloomberg Law Reports® is a registered trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P.
The threat of insolvency proceedings against a corporate debtor can greatly assist a creditor's primary objective of getting paid, preferably in advance of everyone else. This is particularly so where the debtor is prevaricating but there is no genuine dispute that the sum in question is due and owing. Although the courts decry the use of the winding-up procedure as a means of debt collection, it is often a very effective tool.
Consider the following when faced with a corporate debtor who is refusing, without genuine reason, to settle its debts:
The recent decision in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail - UK 2007 - 3BL PLC (Eurosail) has provided helpful guidance on the interpretation of the insolvency tests set out in section 123 of the Insolvency Act 1986. This guidance is not only relevant to companies with financial problems. The common practice of drafting contractual events of default by reference to section 123 means that it has significance to anyone who is creating or is party to contracts (whether finance documents or other commercial contracts) containing this type of provision.
Prescription Advisory Systems & Technology, Inc. (“PAST”), a medical technology and software company, has filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (Case No. 18-12601).
The UK Supreme Court today delivered an important decision on the meaning of the so-called 'balance sheet insolvency test' in s.123(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) (BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail 2007-3BL PLC [2013] UKSC 28 ("Eurosail")).
The current cycle of Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcies involves many cases where the debtor seeks to achieve a balance-sheet restructuring by converting debt into equity. When consensus cannot be achieved, junior stakeholders (i.e., second lien creditors, unsecured creditors and/or equity) will often contest plan confirmation on the grounds that the proposed plan provides more than 100% recovery to the senior creditors. Valuation plays the central role in these cases.
As a result of the recent turmoil in the financial markets, a number of clients have asked us questions about counterparty risk. The following is a summary of some of the key issues in dealing with financial counterparties. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”) and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (“SIPA”) each seek to protect “customer property” in the event of the failure, insolvency or liquidation of a broker-dealer.1 Neither affords customers the certainty of a 100% recovery, however.
On October 31, 2010, Wolverine Tube, Inc. ("Wolverine") filed petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. According to the Declaration of Wolverine's President in Support of Debtors' Petitions (the "Declaration"), the company's bankruptcy filing resulted from several factors, most notably a drop in cash due to volatility in commodity prices and high debt obligations. See Declaration at pp. 2-3.
On September 6, 2010, Schutt Sports ("Schutt" or the "Debtor") filed petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. This post will look briefly at the nature of Schutt's business, why it filed for bankruptcy and what it hopes to achieve while in bankruptcy.
On April 20, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing to discuss public policy issues raised by last month’s report of court-appointed bankruptcy examiner for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman Brothers), Mr. Anton R. Valukas. The Committee heard testimony from the following witnesses:
Panel One: