In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.
Putting it mildly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling last year in Stern v. Marshall, 132 S. Ct. 56 (2011), cast a wrench into the day-to-day operation of U.S. bankruptcy courts scrambling to deal with a deluge of challenges—strategic or otherwise—to the scope of their “core” jurisdiction to issue final orders and judgments on a wide range of disputes. In Stern, the Court ruled that, to the extent that 28 U.S.C.
The United States Supreme Court recently narrowed the scope of the authority of bankruptcy courts, with potential far-reaching implications on past, present and future bankruptcy matters. The case, Stern v. Marshall, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011), began as a dispute between Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband. After several years of litigation and one previous trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court ruled bankruptcy courts lack the authority to enter judgments on counterclaims against a debtor that are based on state law.
"In Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a divided U.S. Supreme Court resolved the circuit split regarding whether a bankruptcy court may, with the consent of the litigants, adjudicate a claim that, though statutorily denominated as “core,” is not otherwise constitutionally determinable by a bankruptcy judge. The majority held that so long as consent—whether express or implied—is “knowing and voluntary,” Article III of the U.S. Constitution is not violated by a bankruptcy court’s adjudication of such a claim.
To Our Clients and Friends Memorandum friedfrank.com Copyright © 2015 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 06/04/15 A Delaware Limited Liability Partnership 1 The Supreme Court Rules That Bankruptcy Judges May Adjudicate Stern Claims with the Parties’ Knowing and Voluntary Consent On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network v.
Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts to Enter Final Judgment on “Stern Claims” Based on Consent of Parties Affirmed
The U.S. Supreme Court in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif1 explicitly affirmed the jurisdiction of Article I bankruptcy courts to issue final decisions on claims for which litigants are constitutionally entitled to Article III adjudication if the parties consent to the bankruptcy court adjudicating such claims.
On May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, so long as parties knowingly and voluntarily consent, a bankruptcy court can issue final orders on matters that it otherwise would not have the constitutional authority to decide. In Wellness Int’l Network v. Sharif,1 a highly anticipated decision, the majority of the Supreme Court delivered a pragmatic opinion that quelled fears stemming from the Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v.
Four years ago, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court stunned many observers by re-visiting separation of powers issues regarding the jurisdiction of the United States bankruptcy courts that most legal scholars had viewed as long settled. Stern significantly reduced the authority of bankruptcy courts, and bankruptcy judges and practitioners both have since been grappling with the ramifications of that decision.
In a case that could have upended the bankruptcy and magistrate court systems, the Supreme Court took a pragmatic approach yesterday when it held in Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif that with “knowing and voluntary consent” of the parties, a bankruptcy court could adjudicate a so-called “Sternclaim,” which would otherwise be outside the scope of its constitutional power. The Court’s 2011 ruling in Stern v.
On Thursday I published a blog article entitled Will “Wellness Make Us Better?, in which I posed the question of whether or not the U.S. Supreme Court would finally rule on whether or not bankruptcy courts can, in Stern type cases, enter a final judgment with the consent of the parties.