On Thursday, the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled in Stern v. Marshall[1] that the congressional grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to issue final judgments on counterclaims to proofs of claim was unconstitutional. For the litigants, this decision brought an end to an expensive and drawn out litigation between the estates of former Playboy model Anna Nicole Smith and the son of her late husband, Pierce Marshall, which Justice Roberts writing for the majority analogized to the fictional litigation in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House.

On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision in the Stern v.

In a significant decision that reinforced the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior plurality decision in Marathon, the Court determined that while bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to hear state-law compulsory counterclaims to a creditor’s proof of claim under section 157(b)(2)(C) of Title 28, Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires such proceedings to be heard by Article III judges where they would not be resolved as part of the claims allowance process.

Introduction

On June 23, 2011, after fifteen years of hugely acrimonious litigation, the Supreme Court of the United States (the “Court”) issued a decision on a narrow legal issue that may end up significantly limiting the scope of bankruptcy courts’ core jurisdiction.  

In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).

The United States Supreme Court will hand down its decision in the next few weeks in the case of Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif (“Wellness”), 727 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2013) regarding bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction.  The jurisdictional quagmire is a major and growing virus in the bankruptcy courts, increasing exponentially the costs of bankruptcy litigation.  Hopefully the Wellness decision will eventually provide a belated prescription on bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction, and make us all feel just peachy.

A little background:

As we all know, on June 9 of this year, the Supreme Court issued its long awaited decision in Executive Benefits Ins. Agency vs. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 189 L. Ed. 2d 83 (2014), which we had hoped would resolve the open questions arising from Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed 2d 475 (2011).

As has been widely publicized, the United States Supreme Court recently provided guidance on a bankruptcy court's  jurisdiction to address certain types of claims, but left open issues of whether parties may consent to bankruptcy court jurisdiction (or waive a lack of jurisdiction argument if not raised early enough) to enter final judgments on certain types of matters.  See Executive Benefits Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 573 U.S. ___ (June 9, 2014).

The Supreme Court has issued two opinions on the subject of bankruptcy court authority and jurisdiction in recent years. The first opinion, Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) was a 5-4 split from 2011 that roiled the bankruptcy waters by raising many questions about the constitutionality of the jurisdiction and authority Congress has provided to bankruptcy courts. The more recent opinion— Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Bellingham, Chapter 7 Trustee of Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.,___ U.S. _, No.

On June 9, 2014, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.),1 a much-anticipated decision, the Supreme Court addressed how bankruptcy courts should adjudicate so-called Stern claims. Stern claims are “core” claims over which bankruptcy courts have statutory authority to enter orders and judgments,2 but which authority the Supreme Court previously held in Stern v. Marshall3 was not permitted (at least with respect to certain issues) under Article III of the United States Constitution.