In this memorandum opinion, the Court of Chancery held that a retiring member of a limited liability company was entitled to his proportionate share of the liquidation value, rather than the going concern value, of the company.
In Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch. 2006), the Delaware Court of Chancery definitively weighed in on the tort claim that has become known by the popular name “deepening insolvency” when it dismissed a “deepening insolvency” claim brought by a litigation trust to recover money for the benefit of the creditors of a bankrupt estate.
In a groundbreaking, and somewhat surprising decision, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held that creditors of a company that is either in the zone of insolvency or actually insolvent cannot, as a matter of law, directly sue directors of the company for breaches of the directors’ fiduciary duties.
In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 2007 WL 1453705 (Del. May 18, 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, provided some clarity on the controversial issue of whether and to what extent creditors have the ability to assert fiduciary duty claims against directors.
On May 18, 2007, in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla (“Gheewalla”),1 the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision2 in which the Court of Chancery precluded creditors from filing direct suits for breach of fiduciary duty against directors of corporations that are either in the zone of insolvency or are actually insolvent. With its decision, the Delaware Supreme Court has limited creditors’ ability to sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty.
We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.
Do officers of a public corporation have an affirmative obligation to monitor corporate affairs? Yes, according to Judge Walsh in his recently issued memorandum opinion in Miller v. McDonald (In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.).1 Although "Caremark" oversight liability had previously generally only been imposed on directors of public corporations, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware determined that officers are not immune from such liability as a matter of law.
A Pennsylvania state court has reportedly ruled, in an unpublished opinion, that the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner may pursue a theory of damages against the accountant of an insolvent insurer based on a legal claim of “deepening insolvency.” SeeArio v. Deloitte & Touche, PICS No. 08-1013 (Pa. Commw. Ct.).
According to press reports, Tammy Andreycak, a former director of accounting at Le-Nature’s Inc., recently pleaded guilty to multiple fraud charges in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The charges included bank fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy and filing false income-tax returns, all allegedly taking place between 2003 and 2006. Andreycak is the first person to be prosecuted in the fraudulent scheme alleged to have occurred at Le-Nature’s.
Recent declines in the trading prices of many companies' debt securities has created opportunities for those companies to reacquire a portion or all of that debt at substantial discounts through open market repurchases, privately negotiated transactions and tender offers. In some cases, the opportunities for discounted repurchases come to companies directly from investors seeking to sell the debt back in order to meet their own cash needs or otherwise obtain liquidity for thinly-traded securities.