For some time now, there has been uncertainty in Australian insolvency law about whether or not insolvency practitioners should apply the statutory priority regimes established by sections 433, 566 and 561 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) when distributing the assets of a “trading trust”. The decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Re Independent Contractor Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (In liq) [No 2] (2016) 305 FLR 222, and the myriad of cases that followed it, suggested that the answer was “no”.

Australia’s corporate insolvency laws are in a process of significant change.

The latest proposed reform concerns the controversial practice of “phoenixing”. In recent months and years, phoenixing has attracted attention from a wide band of Australian regulators.

The Phoenixing Bill

Overview

The perception of Australia as a relatively “risky” place to sit on a board, arises in no small part from the insolvent trading prohibition in section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and how it interacts with general directors’ duties.[1]

Administration and deeds of company arrangement have continued to have significant influence on major restructurings in the Australian market. In larger restructurings, administrations represent significant transactions where capital is deployed strategically to acquire businesses at significant discounts. A sound understanding of the procedures is key to private equity players for many reasons. Portfolio companies can be exposed to administrations where suppliers, customers or competitors experience financial difficulties.

The dialogue is changing yet is the law enabling the practical change Directors need?

Achieving significant cultural shift in any business environment is no easy task, so it’s by no means ground-breaking to declare that after 1 year in operation, it still cannot be said that the new “Safe Harbour” legislation has resulted in a cultural change among directors.

近年来，我国宏观经济增长放缓，国家调整产业和信贷政策，并逐渐加强金融监管，商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加，十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险，迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题，也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。

大敌当前，痛定思痛，当危机来临时，商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划，以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看，危机的表象多种多样，除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机；有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股，有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控，也有的则更为隐蔽，债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付，但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款，甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。

本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路，通盘策划全面追索资产的策略，为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”，以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间，避免弯路：

一、梳理融资文件

As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal”, the Chinese government has been adjusting its industrial and credit-related policies and strengthening regulation of Chinese financial institutions. A large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as actual loan defaults have started to surface. The risks associated with rising levels of NPLs require Chinese banks to enhance their ex ante and ex post credit risk management practices.

It was first published by the Governance Institute of Australia.

(12) 信托计划中受托人对股权投资应当如何进行管理？

实践中，信托计划受托人取得股权主要基于两种情形，一是基于受托而取得股权，即委托人将自己合法持有的股权作为信托财产，转移至受托人管理和处分；二是基于投资而取得股权，即委托人先把自己合法持有的信托资金或其他财产转移至受托人，进而由受托人通过管理、运用该等受托财产，以增资、受让等方式投资取得股权并对该等股权进行管理和处分。

基于受托人取得股权的不同情形，受托人对股权投资的管理责任不完全相同。

如受托人系基于受托取得股权，受托人的股东身份更接近“名义股东”，其对投资股权的管理主要受限于信托合同约定的信托财产的运用及管理方式。

回购条款作为资管产品中常见的增信措施，资管新规对其有何影响？

资管新规之前，回购条款的效力得到法院普遍认可

回购条款本质上是一种逆向的、独立的交易行为，属于合同债权的范畴。其虽然具有一定的债权保障作用，但不构成债权担保的从属性，更不具有担保物权的优先受偿功能。因此，回购条款并非我国的法定担保形式。

资管新规之前，司法实践中，法院在考察当事人意思表示和内容的合法性基础上，一般会认可回购条款的合法有效性。

在“重庆国际信托股份有限公司与安徽三联实业发展有限公司等合同纠纷案”（〔2015〕渝高法民初字第00025号）中，法院认为，“《资产收益权转让及回购协议》系当事人的真实意思表示，不违反法律、行政法规的强制性规定，合法有效。结合信托公司提供的营业执照和金融许可证上载明的内容，信托公司签订的上述合同不违反金融监管部门核准的经营范围；且本案合同所涉的借款资金来源并不影响借款合同本身的效力。”