As many investors anticipated, the deep trough in the commodities market over recent years resulted in a number of companies in commodity industries restructuring their balance sheets through a Chapter 11 bankruptcy process. Because companies often reorganize in the midst of a market downturn, a commodity company’s low EBITDA during this time usually results in low values being placed on the company’s reorganized equity.

A recent decision from the Southern District of New York may reopen a door — which many had believed was all but closed — for disgruntled creditors seeking to challenge failed leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) as fraudulent conveyances. In In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 2016 WL 4030937 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2016), District Judge Denise Cote reinstated an intentional fraudulent conveyance claim seeking to claw back $6.3 billion in distributions made to Lyondell Chemical’s shareholders through an LBO that failed quickly and dramatically.

In a pair of decisions in 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Delaware determined that neither the first lien notes trustee nor the second lien notes trustee of Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Corp. (“EFIH”), a subsidiary of Energy Future Holdings (“EFH”), was entitled to receive a make-whole on the repayment of the corresponding indebtedness resulting from the acceleration of that debt in the EFH bankruptcy case.

Borrowers, agent banks, syndicate members and secondary market purchasers incur, syndicate, sell and buy bank debt on the assumption that bank debt is not a “security.” However, a June 30, 2016, opinion in the General Motors preference litigation¹shows that such an assumption may no longer be valid, at least under the Bankruptcy Code.

On June 28, 2016, Judge Chapman of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled in Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. Bank of America National Association, et al.(Adv. Proc. No. 10-03547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The Third Circuit recently affirmed that a debtor in Chapter 11 can use a tender offer to settle claims without running afoul of the Bankruptcy Code. Although In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.is limited to its particular facts and circumstances, the decision could lead to increased use of tender offers prior to confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.

Several recent cases in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York have created ambiguity about when distressed exchange offers violate Section 316(b) of the 1939 Trust Indenture Act (the “TIA”). It appears that plaintiffs’ lawyers are using this ambiguity to challenge distressed exchange offers. The threat of litigation may give minority bondholders a powerful tool to hinder less than fully consensual out-of-court restructurings and provide them with increased leverage in negotiations.

Virtually all public indentures contain provisions allowing the issuer to cure ambiguities and make other technical changes to the debt documentation without debtholder consent. When the purported ambiguities have substantive consequences, however, issuers may not be able to get away with an amendment that lacks debtholder approval. InGSO Coastline Credit Partners L.P. v. Global A&T Electronics Ltd. (NY App. Div. 1st Dept. May 3, 2016), a New York lower court bought into a “cure of ambiguity” argument and on that basis granted a motion to dismiss.

Market participants involved in distressed exchange offers have become accustomed to grappling with the implications of Trust Indenture Act Section 316(b) in the context of potential exit consents, i.e., are the contemplated amendments to the indenture governing the securities subject to the exchange significant enough to impair or affect the right of a holder to receive payment of principal and interest on or after the due dates of the relevant note?

A typical bond indenture provides that prior to the incurrence of an event of default, a trustee’s obligations are limited to those specifically set forth in the indenture. It is only following the occurrence of an event of default that the trustee’s duties of prudent conduct seem to ripen. This often leaves trustees and bondholders in a state of uncertainty over what actions, if any, a trustee may be obligated to take as the financial condition of an issuer worsens but has not yet crossed the default line. A recent case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Becker v.