目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言，破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中，投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等，其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式（其基本流程如下图），本文将结合实践，从投资人视角，浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范，以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1：破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段，重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例，2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1]；2024年以来，截至11月，有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整，较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见，破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会，其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

在当前的投融资环境下，国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务，对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求，因此，若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区，则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。

优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”，能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此，企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题，可能拉长迁址进度，甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。

为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的，我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上，除了直接变更注册地址，企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整，以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途，如有不慎，同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险，因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。

一、直接迁址的障碍和难点

11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) provides (emphasis added):

• “(c) . . . the condition that a plan be fair and equitable . . . includes . . . (2) . . . all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, . . . will be applied to make payments under the plan.”

There is little-to-no guidance in the Bankruptcy Code on what “as the court may fix” might mean. So, that meaning is left to the courts to decide.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), an individual debtor may be denied a discharge, in its entirely, for making a transfer “with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor or the trustee.

On April 17, 2023, the Bankruptcy Court for Eastern Michigan ruled:

A “silent” creditor in Subchapter V is one who does not vote on the debtor’s plan and does not object to that plan. The “silent” creditor is a problem for Subchapter V cases.

The Problem

Here’s the problem:

Here are a couple discharge-related bankruptcy questions I’ve heard of late, along with an answer.

Question 1. Why are individuals, but not corporations, eligible for a Chapter 7 discharge?

• §727(a)(1) says, “the court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless—(1) the debtor is not an individual” (emphasis added).

Question 2. Why are individuals, but not corporations, subject to § 523(a) discharge exceptions in Chapter 11?

Can non-compete and confidentiality protections in a rejected franchise agreement be discharged in bankruptcy?

The answer is, “No,” according to In re Empower Central Michigan, Inc.[Fn. 1]

Facts

Debtor is an automotive repair shop.

Debtor operates under a Franchise Agreement with Autolab Franchising, LLC. The Franchise Agreement has a non-compete provision, and there is a separate-but-related confidentiality agreement.

The continuing effort in Congress to extend Subchapter V’s $7.5 million debt limit recently hit a snag. The result: the $7.5 million debt limit for Subchapter V eligibility expired on June 21, 2024, and the Subchapter V debt limit is now reduced to an inflation-adjusted $3,024,725.[i]

The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:

• abusive behavior;
• bad faith conduct;
• a means for swindling creditors;
• the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
• a tool for avoiding liability;
• etc., etc.

Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”