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目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言,破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中,投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等,其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式(其基本流程如下图),本文将结合实践,从投资人视角,浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范,以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1:破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段,重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例,2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1];2024年以来,截至11月,有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整,较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见,破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会,其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

在当前的投融资环境下,国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务,对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求,因此,若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区,则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。

优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”,能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此,企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题,可能拉长迁址进度,甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。

为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的,我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上,除了直接变更注册地址,企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整,以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途,如有不慎,同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险,因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。

一、直接迁址的障碍和难点

The long-awaited amendment "H" of the Slovenian Financial Operations, Insolvency Proceedings and Compulsory Dissolution Act (the "Act") entered into force on 1 November 2023. The new provisions complete the transposition of Directive 2019/1023,[1] introducing three crucial sets of changes to the Slovenian insolvency and restructuring legislation.

In our practice, we have found that the most common reason for distressed companies to initiate reorganisation measures is a severe liquidity squeeze.

Driven by regulation, banks are increasingly reluctant to grant senior bridge financings, leading companies to resort to trade credits of major suppliers, such as deferrals or generous payment agreements. But these trade creditors are often unaware of significant third-party liability risks.

Shareholders of Austrian limited liability companies ("GmbH") often stipulate the right to purchase the shares of co-shareholders in certain events. These "share purchase rights" (Aufgriffsrechte) entitle the remaining shareholders to acquire the share of a shareholder when a contractually defined event (Aufgriffsfälle), like insolvency or the death of a shareholder, occurs. Often these rights are laid down in articles of association or a separate shareholders' agreement (Syndikatsvertrag). They are generally qualified as option rights.

After a delay of more than a year, an Act on Preventive Restructuring (the "Act") implementing the EU directive on preventive restructuring frameworks finally became effective in the Czech Republic on 23 September 2023. The long-awaited Act introduced a brand-new legal tool enabling viable enterprises in temporary financial distress to achieve restructuring outside insolvency proceedings. It is a voluntary and flexible process requiring cooperation with creditors, but not necessarily with all of them.

Who can use it?

Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are becoming increasingly influential, especially in M&A transactions. It is essential to consider how these regulations will affect foreign creditors, particularly those from non-EU countries. The Slovak FDI Act will have numerous implications for financing and security arrangements.

Security package

After a delay of more than a year, an act on preventive restructuring (the "Act") implementing the EU directive on preventive restructuring frameworks finally became effective in the Czech Republic on 23 September 2023. The long-awaited Act introduces a brand-new legal tool preventing the insolvency of viable enterprises in temporary financial distress.

What is preventive restructuring and why use it?

"Bulgaria transposed the Restructuring Directive's prohibition to terminate contracts via ipso facto clauses, but also (deviating from the Directive) prohibited contractual set-off in restructuring, thus rendering the preservation of many contracts performed via contractual set-off / netting of payment meaningless. So, in drafting ipso facto clauses the impossibility to perform contracts in restructuring, due to the contractual set-off prohibition, may be utilised as an additional trigger for termination, now".