目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言，破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中，投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等，其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式（其基本流程如下图），本文将结合实践，从投资人视角，浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范，以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1：破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段，重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例，2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1]；2024年以来，截至11月，有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整，较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见，破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会，其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

在当前的投融资环境下，国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务，对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求，因此，若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区，则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。

优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”，能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此，企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题，可能拉长迁址进度，甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。

为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的，我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上，除了直接变更注册地址，企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整，以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途，如有不慎，同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险，因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。

一、直接迁址的障碍和难点

As we turn to a new year, my wife and I like to reminisce about our best days and milestones of the prior year (for 2023, it was a huge celebration with our best friends for my wife’s birthday, an epic bike ride with our kids on a beautiful day in Kiawah, and seeing “the Boss” in concert in Greensboro). Professionally, I find myself thinking about my friend and mentor, George Cauthen, who reached a milestone and retired from the active practice of law in 2023.

In Matter of Imperial Petroleum Recovery Corp., 84 F.4th 264 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit was asked to address whether 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) – the federal statute providing for post-judgment interest – applies in adversary proceedings even though 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) doesn’t explicitly refer to bankruptcy courts.

In earlier posts, the Red Zone has discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), which held that increased U.S.

In earlier posts, the Red Zone has discussed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), which held that increased U.S. Trustee quarterly fees for large Chapter 11 debtors between 2018 and 2020 under the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017 (the “2017 Act”) were unconstitutional because of disparate treatment of Chapter 11 debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator (“BA”) districts, and subsequent judicial decisions determining the appropriate remedy for debtors who overpaid those fees.

On July 25, 2023, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued an important opinion protecting the rights of stalking horse bidders in Section 363 sales. In the Matter of Bouchard Transportation Company, Inc. involved one of the largest petroleum shipping companies in the United States. Bouchard sought to sell a large portion of its assets, consisting of certain vessels, through a Bankruptcy Court approved auction. In anticipation of the auction, Bouchard sought, and the Bankruptcy Court entered a bidding procedures order.

We have previously discussed the growing list of judicial decisions addressing the appropriate remedy for overpayment of U.S. Trustee (“UST”) quarterly fees. In U.S. Tr. Region 21 v. Bast Amron LLP (In re Mosaic Mgmt. Grp., Inc.), No. 20-12547, 2023 WL 4144557 (11th Cir.

In Matter of Texxon Petrochemicals, L.L.C., 67 F.4th 259 (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit held that even if an appeal is equitably moot, the appellate court nonetheless has appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, without reaching the issue of equitable mootness.