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目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言,破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中,投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等,其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式(其基本流程如下图),本文将结合实践,从投资人视角,浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范,以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1:破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段,重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例,2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1];2024年以来,截至11月,有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整,较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见,破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会,其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

在当前的投融资环境下,国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务,对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求,因此,若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区,则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。

优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”,能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此,企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题,可能拉长迁址进度,甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。

为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的,我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上,除了直接变更注册地址,企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整,以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途,如有不慎,同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险,因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。

一、直接迁址的障碍和难点

The impact of COVID-19 is being felt at all levels of the economy and will work its way through bankruptcy courts for years to come. In these early days, many creditors who are themselves suffering are providing assistance to troubled companies. Suppliers and commercial landlords are agreeing to various forms of relief, including modified credit terms and rent relief to allow customers to bridge this period of unprecedented disruption. While these corporate good Samaritans are providing immediate aid they may be subjecting themselves to the risk of future losses.

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

Last week, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act was signed into law, implementing broad relief for individuals and businesses affected by COVID-19. One of the sections of the CARES Act receiving less attention is a temporary amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to provide streamlined reorganization procedures for businesses with debt of less than $7.5 million.

As the nation hunkers down to combat the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), bankruptcy courts throughout the country have moved quickly to implement procedures to preserve access to the courts while limiting in-person interaction during the crisis. Each court’s specific COVID-19 procedures are different, but they largely prohibit in-person hearings, recognize the need for flexibility and adjournments for non-emergent matters whenever possible, and encourage the creative use of technology to allow as many matters to go forward as scheduled, including evidentiary hearings.

Social distancing. Elbow bumps. Flatten the curve. These are the new phrases and behaviors we have learned to avoid exposure to the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). This epic struggle forces us to reexamine and reevaluate our daily habits, lifestyles and customs as we work collectively to minimize the harm to our families, friends and neighbors throughout the United States.

On February 25, 2020, in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 18-1269 (U.S. 2020), the U.S. Supreme Court effectively ruled that the so-called “Bob Richards rule” should not be used to determine which member of a group of corporations filing a consolidated federal income tax return is entitled to a federal income tax refund.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).