Welcome to the latest edition of Buddle Findlay’s insolvency update. It comes against the background of an economy that remains under stress. Unemployment is the highest it has been since the depths of Covid-19, and many businesses are struggling with tax payments. There is more than NZ$1.4b owed to the IRD in unpaid GST and PAYE from the 2025 tax year, and that's just a small part of the approximately NZ$8b the IRD is now chasing.

In a judgment issued yesterday (Francis v Gross [2024] NZCA 528), the Court of Appeal unanimously overturned the controversial High Court decision in Francis v Gross [2023] NZHC 1107 and held that purchasers of partly constructed modular buildings (pods) did not have equitable liens (at all, and especially not in priority to secured creditors) over those pods.

We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has decisively redrawn the boundaries between arbitration agreements and insolvency proceedings in the case of Sian Participation Corp (In Liquidation) v Halimeda International Ltd.[1]

Insolvenzanträge von namhaften Projektentwicklern und Immobiliengesellschaften stellen die betroffenen Unternehmen und ihre Gläubiger vor große Herausforderungen und setzen die gesamte Immobilienbranche unter Druck. Gleichzeitig gewinnen alternative Restrukturierungsmethoden, die außerhalb oder bereits im Vorfeld eines formalen Insolvenzverfahrens stattfinden, zunehmend an Bedeutung.

Vor diesem Hintergrund fällt auch vermehrt das Stichwort “StaRUG“, wenn es um die Restrukturierung von immobilienhaltenden Gesellschaften geht.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

We have previouslyblogged about the section 546(e) defense to a trustee’s avoidance powers under the Bankruptcy Code. A trustee has broad powers to set aside certain transfers made by debtors before bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.