OLG Naumburg verneint Haftung der Organe eines insolventen Zeitarbeitsunternehmens gegenüber den Einzugsstellen.

Bislang ist von der Rechtsprechung nicht abschließend geklärt, ob eine persönliche Haftung der Organe eines Zeitarbeitsunternehmens wie der Geschäftsführung gegenüber den Einzugsstellen in Betracht kommt.

Sometimes different bits of legislation are, on the face of it, in conflict with each other. This is specially so when new law is introduced. The impact of new law on old law sets up contradictions, which the courts have to sort out. An interesting recent example arose in the context of business rescue.

The issue in this case was whether a payment of R389 593.49 by Ditona – a company being wound-up – to another company Eravin, was recoverable by Ditona’s liquidators as a void disposition or unrecoverable because, it was a pre-business rescue debt, which may not be enforced.

On 21 September 2016, the Western Cape High Court (Court) handed down judgement in the case of Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others (Rogers J) [2016] ZAWCHC 124 in terms of which the Court considered, among other questions, the following:

It is now generally accepted that the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) is an overhaul of our corporate law landscape. This shift is even more evident with the introduction of a new business rescue regime and along with it, the general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.

Section 133 of the Act provides that no legal proceedings including enforcement action may commence or continue against a company undergoing business rescue, save where amongst other exceptions, consent is granted by the court or obtained from the business rescue practitioner.

Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.

Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.

In Hattingh v Roux NO & Others 2011 (3) SA 135 (WCC), the plaintiff, Hattingh, sought to show that the defendant, Roux junior, intentionally and unlawfully injured Hattingh by executing an illegal and highly dangerous manoeuvre during a scrum in an Under 19 rugby match between two Western Cape high school teams.

Among other issues considered by the court was the delictual ground of intent: whether Roux junior, if he had in fact executed the manoeuvre which injured Hattingh, acted negligently or intentionally in doing so.

The case of Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café CC trading as Newscafé Bedfordview case number 2016/11853 GLDJ reiterated the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) decision in Cloete Murray NO & another v Firstrand Bank Ltd T/A Wesbank 2015 (3) SA 438 (SCA) that an agreement can be cancelled during business rescue as the unilateral act of cancellation does not constitute enforcement action in terms of s133(1) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 ( Act).

There is little doubt that even the most thought-out, meticulous and well-structured business rescue plan cannot succeed unless there is some degree of financial support in the form of post-commencement finance (PCF) available, to allow the business to sail through the choppy waters of financial distress.

In Umso Construction (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Roads and Public Works Eastern Cape Province and Others ((20800/2014) [2016] ZASCA 61), the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the legal position where, following the award of a tender, it is discovered that the preferred bidder had been placed under business rescue during the bid evaluation process.

Die aus Sicht der deutschen Volks- wirtschaft erhebliche Kapitalanlage- tätigkeit von Versicherungsunterneh- men (VU) unterliegt den aufsichts- rechtlichen Vorgaben des Versiche- rungsaufsichtsgesetzes (VAG). Im Hinblick auf die Vorgaben der euro- päischen Solvency II-Richtlinie haben sich mit Inkrafttreten des neuen VAG zum 1. Januar 2016 (VAG n.F.) Ände- rungen der Anforderungen an die Kapitalanlage von VU ergeben. Dies gibt Anlass, einen Blick auf die wichtigsten Neuerungen zu werfen.

A.   Bisherige Rechtslage