In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).

Anders als die Insolvenzordnung, sieht die EU-Richtlinie zum vorinsolvenzlichen Sanierungsverfahren keine Einschränkung der Arbeitnehmerrechte vor.

BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.

“Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on the sequestration of the estate of the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards the third party but not exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify the insured” – s156 of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 as amended (Act).

In the case of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Intertrans Earl SA (Pty) Ltd & Others (34716/2016) [2016] ZAGPJHC 310 (25 November 2016), the court had to consider two important issues: firstly, whether suspension of a contract by the business rescue practitioner in terms of s136(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act, No 1971 of 2008 (Act) suspends not only the obligations of the business rescue practitioner to perform in terms of the contract entered into between the parties, but whether it also suspends the obligations of the other contracting parties.

The creditors of a company in financial distress are often faced with various options. A debtor company can either be liquidated, placed in business rescue or enter into a compromise with its creditors without first being placed in liquidation. Although an offer of compromise, at first glance, may seem very attractive to creditors, there may be many pitfalls of which creditors must be aware.

Creditors face daily uphill battles when trying to collect money from debtors. Not only has the National Credit Act, No 34 of 2005 made it more onerous on creditors to recover debts due to them, but creditors must constantly be aware of the threat of a claim prescribing.

The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Act) provides that a debt is extinguished by prescription after the period set out in the Act.

In Freshvest Investments (Pty) Ltd v Marabeng (Pty) Ltd (1030/2015) [2016] ZASCA 168, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was afforded the opportunity to pronounce on the so called Badenhorst rule which assumes its name from Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T).

Affirmative action measures were introduced in South Africa to reconcile the injustices of the past. Although policies have been implemented for the achievement of equality for persons previously disadvantaged, at what point do these policies unjustifiably infringe the rights of persons affected by them?

Banking & Finance Banking & Finance Dezember / December 2016 4 | Editorial Fokus 6 | Verschärfung der Regulierung auf dem sog. Zweitmarkt – Anlageberatung und -vermittlung von Vermögensanlagen ab 2017 KWG-erlaubnispflichtig 8 | Anforderungen an ein schlüssiges Sanierungskonzept zur Verhinderung einer Insolvenzanfechtung aus Sicht der Gläubiger Aufsichtsrecht 10 | Zusätzliche Anforderungen an die Ausgestaltung einer Limitation Language aufgrund des Asset-Stripping-Verbots gemäß § 292 Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (KAGB)?