The phrase “Texas Two-Step,” as used in bankruptcy, is a legal expletive. Regardless of what the details of a Texas Two-Step might be, the phrase has become synonymous with:

• abusive behavior;
• bad faith conduct;
• a means for swindling creditors;
• the antithesis of “doing what’s right”;
• a tool for avoiding liability;
• etc., etc.

Describing a legal tactic as a “Texas Two-Step” is like calling that tactic a “#$&*#%R&” or “#*$&.” It’s a legal expletive that means “really, really bad.”

Here’s a dilemma:

• Should bankruptcy be available as a tool for resolving mass tort cases of all types (like it already is in asbestos contexts)?

Here’s an illustration of the dilemma:

• many tort claimants in the Johnson & Johnson case DO NOT want bankruptcy involved; but
• many tort claimants in the Purdue Pharma case were BEGGING the courts to approve the bankruptcy plan.

How do we solve this dilemma?

The IBBI Working Group on Group Insolvency (under the chairmanship of UK Sinha) and the MCA Cross Border Insolvency Rules/Regulations Committee having submitted their reports (collectively “Reports”) had recommended the introduction of a framework governing the resolution of enterprise groups under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) in September 2019 and December 2021 respectively.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion is Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., Inc., Case No. 22-1079, Decided June 6, 2024.

Opinion’s Q & A

The Truck Insurance question is this:

• Whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under § 1109(b)?

The Supreme Court’s answer is this:

This compendium presents a curated collection of judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Securities Appellate Tribunal ("SAT") from 2019 to 2024. Established to hear and dispose of appeals against orders passed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI), and the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), SAT plays a pivotal role in shaping the regulatory landscape of the financial and securities markets in India.

Under the framework of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), an asset reconstruction company (ARC) has wide powers to revive a company facing financial difficulties. It can use securitisation, reconstruction and recovery for quick resolution of distressed debt. As an alternative, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), allows ARCs with access to a formal resolution process, which has the advantage of the borrower emerging debt-free with a clean slate.

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the eighth in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

• whether the Subchapter V trustee or other party in interest should be allowed to file a plan after debtor’s removal from possession.[Fn. 1]

Recommendation

Since the inception of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code“), the debt resolution regime in India has witnessed not only a paradigm shift from the conventional ‘debtor in possession’ to a progressive ‘creditor in control’ but has also undergone a significant transformation, marking a departure from its traditional labyrinthine processes to a more streamlined and effective framework.

We have a direct statutory conflict:

• one statute requires an ERISA dispute to be resolved in arbitration; but
• a bankruptcy statute requires the same dispute to be resolved in bankruptcy.

Which statute should prevail? The bankruptcy statute, of course.

• That’s the conclusion of In re Yellow Corp.[Fn. 1]

Statutory Conflict

The In re Yellow Corp. case presents a direct conflict between these two federal statutes (emphases added):

On April 23, 2024, the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Subchapter V Task Force issued its Final Report.

This article is the seventh in a series summarizing and condensing the Task Force’s Final Report into “a nutshell.” The subject of this article is:

• whether the $7,500,000 debt cap for Subchapter V eligibility should remain or revert to an interest-adjusted $3,024,725.

Recommendation