Generally, once a company enters into liquidation, litigation against that company cannot be commenced or be continued without the leave of the Court (Corporations Act 2001, s 471B). However, occasionally a liquidator may cause a company to commence or defend litigation after the commencement of the winding up. What happens if the company in liquidation is unsuccessful in that litigation and is subject to an adverse cost order? How will such an adverse cost order rank amongst other competing creditors?

Getting to the top

The liability of directors of major organisations receives wide coverage in the press. Examples (in the Netherlands) are Imtech, HDI, FC Twente, Vestia, and Meavita. But the subject really concerns directors of all legal entities, large and small. In this issue of Quoted, we refresh your knowledge of directors' liability and address recent developments, such as case law on `corporate directors' (legal entities which are appointed directors of other entities), the Bill for Management and Supervision of Legal Entities and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

In de pers gaat het veelal over de aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders van grotere organisaties zoals Imtech, HDI, FC Twente, Vestia en Meavita. In werkelijkheid gaat dit onderwerp bestuurders aan van alle rechtspersonen: van groot tot klein. Met deze Genoteerd frissen wij uw kennis op over de aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders. Wij staan ook stil bij belangrijke relevante recente ontwikkelingen, zoals rechtspraak over de zogeheten rechtspersoon-bestuurder, het Wetsvoorstel bestuur en toezicht rechtspersonen en de Algemene verordening gegevensverwerking.

The Federal Court of Australia recently struck off an insolvency practitioner from the register of liquidators and restrained him for ten years for acting as an insolvency practitioner. The case concerns the conduct of David Iannuzi, who the Court found had "repeatedly fell short of the standards that would ordinarily be expected of him as a competent registered liquidator". The judgment sets out in detail the conduct that the Court found to be unsatisfactory and serves as a reminder of the standards expected of liquidators.

Background

It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?

Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.

The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).

On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.

Op 7 juni 2019 heeft de Hoge Raad uitspraak gedaan in een procedure over de niet-voortzettingseis in de liquidatieverliesregeling die Loyens & Loeff namens een cliënt heeft gevoerd tegen de Belastingdienst.

Op grond van een Europese richtlijn gelden specifieke regels die beogen om werknemers te beschermen als er sprake is van een bedrijfsovername die in juridische zin aangemerkt kan worden als ‘overgang van onderneming’ (OVO). Deze bescherming geldt echter niet indien de werkgever in staat van faillissement is verklaard.