为创新经济发展模式、扩大对外开放力度，国家设立大湾区并着力将其打造为充满活力的世界级城市群和内地与港澳深度合作示范区。从定位不难看出，实行充分的市场经济和法治经济，为全国经济发展提供新的引擎和全新的模式，无疑是粤港澳大湾区的重要使命。要完成这一神圣使命，离不开破产重整制度。通过破产重整，挽救那些一时陷入财务困境和经营困境的企业，从而为湾区经济健康发展保驾护航。SX公司通过破产重整涅槃重生，就是破产重整制度保驾护航的典型案例。

一、企业初探：破产重整的机遇与挑战

1、SX公司基本情况

SX公司成立于1981年，于1994年在深交所上市，总股本约35000万股，其中流通股18000万股，限售流通股17000万股。

SX公司控股或参股四家实业公司，分别为科技公司、实业公司、饲料公司和西部公司。

2、SX公司重整受理情况

因不能清偿到期债务，经债权人饲料公司申请，深圳市中级人民法院（下称深圳中院）于2009年11月10日裁定SX公司进入重整程序，并指定北京市金杜（深圳）律师事务所担任管理人。

For some time now, there has been uncertainty in Australian insolvency law about whether or not insolvency practitioners should apply the statutory priority regimes established by sections 433, 566 and 561 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) when distributing the assets of a “trading trust”. The decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Re Independent Contractor Services (Aust) Pty Ltd (In liq) [No 2] (2016) 305 FLR 222, and the myriad of cases that followed it, suggested that the answer was “no”.

Section 154 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) provides that a business rescue plan (BR plan) may provide that a creditor, who has acceded to the discharge of the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor, will lose the right to enforce the debt or part of it. Furthermore, if a BR plan has been approved and implemented, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process, except to the extent provided for in the BR plan.

The legal principles relating to execution against movable property are more or less settled, less so the law relating to execution against immovable property. This is mainly because the right to housing is enshrined in s26 of the Constitution and the issue of land has become somewhat emotive and politicised in the recent past.

In many, if not all, commercial transactions, timing is everything, either for a distressed seller or a purchaser stumbling upon a deal that may almost be too good to be true. There is often no time to waste and a deal must be closed as soon as possible. In the haste of closing a deal, whether in the form of a sale of business or a sale of assets, the parties often agree not to comply with the provisions of s34(1) of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act), each willing to take the risk in not doing so.

Section 34(1) of the Act provides that:

It is trite that the purpose of business rescue proceedings is to rehabilitate companies that have fallen on hard times, with a hope of either rescuing them or to provide a better return to creditors than what they would receive on a liquidation. This was reiterated in the recent Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) judgment of Van Staden and Others NNO v Pro-Wiz (Pty) Ltd (412/2018) [2019] ZASCA 7 (8 March 2019).

Australia’s corporate insolvency laws are in a process of significant change.

The latest proposed reform concerns the controversial practice of “phoenixing”. In recent months and years, phoenixing has attracted attention from a wide band of Australian regulators.

The Phoenixing Bill

The Bill aims to amend, among others, the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Insolvency Act) to provide that secured creditors holding property pledged as security for the obligations of a South African party arising under a “master agreement” may:

Overview

The perception of Australia as a relatively “risky” place to sit on a board, arises in no small part from the insolvent trading prohibition in section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and how it interacts with general directors’ duties.[1]

Administration and deeds of company arrangement have continued to have significant influence on major restructurings in the Australian market. In larger restructurings, administrations represent significant transactions where capital is deployed strategically to acquire businesses at significant discounts. A sound understanding of the procedures is key to private equity players for many reasons. Portfolio companies can be exposed to administrations where suppliers, customers or competitors experience financial difficulties.