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The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

Now everything will be better! The new ESUG legislation which entered into force on 1 March 2012 has generated huge expectations. The somewhat unwieldy title of “Law for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Businesses” covers a raft of significant changes to the Insolvency Act and existing restructuring regulations. Its objectives are ambitious. The ESUG is intended to make business restructuring easier, more effective and faster – thus a press release from the Federal Ministry of Justice dated 23 February 2012.

In insolvency proceedings, claims for repayment of shareholder loans – particularly if granted to a company limited by shares or a limited commercial partnership – are generally subordinate. In its judgment of 15 November 2011 (II ZR 6/11), the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) addressed whether and for what period this also applied to corresponding claims by former shareholders.

The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) pronounced on double securities in its eagerly anticipated judgment of 1 December 2011 (IX ZR 11/11). The practice was controversial even before the Act for the Modernisation of Limited Liability Company Law and for the Prevention of Abuse (Gesetz zur Modernisierung des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen, MoMiG) came into force. “Double security” arises where security is provided over a creditor‘s claim both by the company itself and by its shareholders.

On 27 October 2011, the German parliament adopted the Law for Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of Businesses (Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen, ESUG), which entered into force on 1 March 2012. In particular, legislators have increased the importance of debtequity swaps as part of this reform. Significant practical obstacles that previously often caused debt-equity transactions to fail have now been removed.

Previous legal framework

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.

We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.