BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.

De Le Cuona v Big Apple Marketing Ltd, Chancery Division, 12 April 2017 

Easement to park; illusory; true construction of a deed

The case confirmed that the provisions of the CPR apply to applications for an extension of time to apply for rescission of a winding up order. The case further stated that any such extensions of time should be exceptional and for a very short period.

Facts

Facts

Facts

This case concerned the rejection by the liquidators of Saff One LLP (‘LLP’) of a proof of debt lodged by ESS. The issue was whether a tax mitigation structure involving a loan to LLP for purported investment in the Ultra Green Scheme gave rise to a provable debt if the monies ‘loaned’ passed in a circle and no such investment was made.

Facts

A Trustee in Bankruptcy (‘TiB’) applied for committal of a bankrupt (‘B’) for contempt for repeated failure to provide financial information sought in conjunction with an application for an Income Payment Order (‘IPO’).

Facts

Mr Mikki is a photographer (‘the Bankrupt’). Bankruptcy was 2010 when pertinently he had a bank account with £1,500 in it and a car.

The £1,500 was spent, but £3,000 was subsequently paid in. When the account was frozen it again had £1,500 in it. After investigations it was determined that this money derived from post-bankruptcy income and was returned. Those investigations took some time and the Bankrupt demanded penal interest.

This article was first published in the LexisNexis Corporate Rescue and Insolvency Journal (2017) 2 CRI 45.

Key Issues

“Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on the sequestration of the estate of the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards the third party but not exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify the insured” – s156 of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 as amended (Act).

In the case of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Intertrans Earl SA (Pty) Ltd & Others (34716/2016) [2016] ZAGPJHC 310 (25 November 2016), the court had to consider two important issues: firstly, whether suspension of a contract by the business rescue practitioner in terms of s136(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act, No 1971 of 2008 (Act) suspends not only the obligations of the business rescue practitioner to perform in terms of the contract entered into between the parties, but whether it also suspends the obligations of the other contracting parties.