On February 1, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) released its long-awaited decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers1 (“Indalex”). By a five to two majority, the SCC allowed the appeal from the 2011 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) which had created so much uncertainty about the relative priorities of debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lending charges and pension claims in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings.

The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act¹ (the “CCAA”) is by far the most flexible Canadian law under which a corporation can restructure its business. When compared against theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act² (the “BIA”), the CCAA looks like a blank canvass and lends itself well to invention and mutual compromise.

Over the last several years, the number of Chapter 15 filings has continued to grow. One of the most prominent of these bankruptcy filings is the Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. case. When last we reported on theVitro case, the Texas bankruptcy court administering the Chapter 15 case had denied recognition to the Mexican restructuring plan of Vitro because the plan provided third party releases to non-debtors. See Vitro, S.A.B.: Bankruptcy Court Refuses to Recognize Mexican Concurso That Releases Claims Against Non-Debtors” (November 2012).

Last Fall, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a decision in the Charter Communications bankruptcy case which will create additional significant challenges for those seeking to appeal confirmation of plans of reorganization that have been implemented. See 691 F.3d 476. Upon implementation (or “substantial consummation”) of the plan, the Second Circuit presumes that the appeal of such plan is equitably moot. Appellants bear the burden of overcoming that presumption.

When does the selection of a technically correct venue become “unjust”? This was the core question Judge Shelley Chapman was required to grapple with when Patriot Coal and almost 100 of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy in New York this past summer. Should it matter that Patriot Coal created the New York subsidiaries, that permitted a New York court filing, about a month prior to the actual bankruptcy filing?

In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor-licensor’s rejection of an executory trademark license does not terminate the licensee’s right to use the trademark. The decision creates a circuit-level split that may invite Supreme Court review. However, no final resolution is likely soon. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, denying a petition for a writ of certiorari in December of 2012.

On February 1, the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) released its long-awaited decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steel Workers. By a five to two majority, the SCC allowed the appeal from the 2011 decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) which had created so much uncertainty about the priority of pension claims in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings.

In October 2012, The Futura Loyalty Group Inc. (“Futura”) commenced proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). On November 13, 2012, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) considered Futura’s request to permit pre-filing, prepayment obligations to its key customers.

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a procedure to obtain recognition of a foreign bankruptcy, insolvency or debt adjustment proceeding (a “foreign proceeding”) in the United States. Chapter 15 draws a distinction between a “foreign main proceeding” (i.e., a foreign proceeding pending in a country where the debtor has the center of its main interests) and a “foreign nonmain proceeding” (i.e., a foreign proceeding pending where the debtor has “an establishment”).

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code is a “safe harbor” provision which restricts a debtor’s ability to recover or “clawback” what would otherwise be “avoidable” payments made to creditors. In the recent case of Lightfoot v. MXEnergy Elec., Inc., 690 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth U.S.