Objective
The new preventive restructuring procedure aims to deal with companies in financial difficulty before serious problems arise. The measures focus on preventing the insolvency of businesses to preserve their viability.
Main characteristics
Background
Under German insolvency law, employees are generally protected from claw-back claims. The payment of wages is considered a "cash transaction" if the employer pays the salary within three months of the work being performed. A “cash transaction” can only be contested in limited circumstances. Where a third party pays the salary, the cash transaction privilege remains if it is not clear to the employee that a third party made the payment (s.142(2) and s.3 InsO).
A recent German Federal Court of Justice ruling shows that this protection has limits.
On 16 September 2021, ordinance 2021-1193 implemented the European Directive on preventive restructuring frameworks into French law. The Ordinance applies to proceedings opened from 1 October 2021.
Key features
The English High Court has rejected a creditor's application to bring a moratorium to an end following the monitors' decision not to terminate the moratorium.
Background
A monitor must terminate the moratorium if they 'think' that the company is unable to pay any pre-moratorium debts for which the company does not have a 'payment holiday'. Surprisingly, debts arising under an agreement involving 'financial services' are excluded from the payment holiday.
Decision
The UK High Court has excluded 'out of the money' creditors and shareholders from voting on Smile Telecoms Holdings Limited’s (Smile) restructuring plan because they did not have a genuine economic interest in the company.
Background
Under German insolvency law, a company is over-indebted when its existing assets do not fully cover its debts and there is no positive going concern prognosis. A positive going concern prognosis is assumed if the company has sufficient liquid funds available for a certain period to satisfy all liabilities at maturity and its profitability will be restored in accordance with a business plan.
Recent court decisions and legislative clarification
Over-indebtedness remains a ground for insolvency
根据测算，截止2022年年初，国内烂尾项目规模已经超过2万亿，随着2021年大型房地产公司接连“暴雷”，势必会产生更多的烂尾或接近烂尾的项目。对于商业逻辑自洽的单体项目破产重组，借助破产清算或重整程序分兵突围势必成为地方政府主导重整的最优路径。但是鉴于目前的房地产市场行情以及烂尾项目续建的特点，大部分重整投资人，尤其是财务投资类型的重整投资人更倾向于采用固定收益的方式进行项目重整，既能实现维护稳定的社会效果，又能最大限度地保证投资安全。因此，如何在当前法律架构下保障固定收益重整投资人的利益是本文中讨论的主要问题。
一 重整投资人的收益模式对比
重整投资人参与烂尾项目的收益模式大致可以分为固定收益模式、风险收益模式和固定加风险收益模式。不同的收益模式下重整投资人有不同的投资逻辑，也有不同的退出模式。我们从投入、收益、风险以及安全性角度对固定收益模式与风险收益模式进行了比较。
（一）固定收益模式
固定收益模式的特点是重整投资人投入重整资金，约定固定收益率，在最终财产变现所得中优先收回投资本金及收益，项目剩余资产全部用于债权清偿。
根据全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查企业破产法实施情况的报告，党的十八大以来，随着供给侧结构性改革持续深化，加快建立和完善市场主体挽救和退出机制，加之新冠肺炎疫情对于宏观经济运行的深刻影响，我国企业破产案件数量快速上升，2017年至2020年受理和审结的破产案件分别占到《企业破产法》实施以来案件总量的54%和41%。[1]区别于传统的中小企业破产重整，大型或超大型企业集团的资产结构复杂、债务规模巨大、历史遗留问题众多，进入破产重整程序之后，如何在《企业破产法》的框架下实现资产重组与债务清偿、持续运营与杠杆处置、重整效率与债权人保护等多重利益关系的合理平衡，成为破产实务中的难点与痛点。随着2021年B集团实质合并重整案（以下简称“B集团重整案”）和海航集团等三百二十一家公司实质合并重整案（以下简称“海航集团重整案”）中信托计划的引入，破产重整程序中引入信托计划作为新型破产重整模式引起业界关注。本文将结合笔者在破产重整程序中设立信托计划的服务经验，简要介绍破产重整程序中信托计划定位与架构、信托机制与破产重整程序的衔接等相关实务难点问题，以供参考。
一. 破产重整程序中信托计划的概念和优势
In Re Edengate Homes (Butley Hall) Ltd (in liquidation) Lock v Stanley (in his capacity as liquidator) and another [2021] EWHC 2970 (Ch), the High Court has confirmed that to reverse a liquidator's assignment of claims to a third party, the claimant must satisfy a 'formidable' test.
Background
Background
When the validity of an agreed interest rate is the subject of a dispute between the parties to a loan agreement in Germany, the insolvency courts do not have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. This is something only the civil courts can do.
Impact
If lenders provide sufficient evidence of the loan interest amount, ie usually the loan agreement, the debtor is required to prove that the interest rate contradicts public policy or is unreasonably high.