Even if the statutory conditions for cramming down the votes of dissenting creditors has been met, the court retains a discretion to consider other factors

Certain statutory conditions need to be met in order for the court to sanction a plan at least one class of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) – referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating that dissenting creditors are no worse off under a contested restructuring plan than in the relevant alternative is an essential requirement for the court to exercise its power to sanction the plan

The power of the court to sanction a restructuring plan where one or more classes of creditors or members has not voted in favour of the plan by the requisite majority (being 75% in value of those present and voting) is referred to as the "cross-class cram down".

Demonstrating what would most likely happen if a restructuring plan were not sanctioned is an essential element for the exercise of the court's discretion to cram down the votes of dissenting creditors

Restructuring plans under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) may provide an alternative for companies in financial distress to formal insolvency (see our previous Insight).

Where a creditor believes that a debtor is insolvent, any “third-party application” that it makes for the insolvency of the debtor must be well substantiated.

Decision

The District Court of Hamburg recently considered an application for insolvency on grounds of illiquidity due to default in social security contributions.

A landmark decision of the German Federal Court (13 June 2006 – IX ZB 238/05) held that the illiquidity of a company could be assumed where it was in default for more than six months of social security contributions.

A proposed amendment to the Insolvency Act, has been approved by the government and is currently under discussion in the Czech Parliament. It is expected to significantly alleviate the situation for debtors seeking debt relief. The previous government had intended to introduce similar changes; however, the legislative process was halted by the end of its term.

Current position

Currently, debtors can achieve debt relief only after 5 years of "good conduct", unless they:

In Hunt v Singh, the Court referred to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in BTI v Sequana (see our alert) in deciding when the directors' duty to creditors arose.

Background

Marylebone Warwick Balfour Management Limited (the Company), entered a tax avoidance scheme between 2002 and 2010 which the directors, on professional advice, believed to be valid.

The Court of Appeal has recently referred to established case law that the court will only interfere with the act of an officeholder “if he has done something so utterly unreasonable and absurd that no reasonable man would have done it”.

While the judge in the lower court had not made any error of law, on the facts there were identifiable flaws in the judge's reasoning that the trustees' decision not to join in the proceedings was perverse.

The judge had failed to recognise that:

Restructuring plans can provide companies in the early stages of financial difficulty with a flexible alternative to entering a formal insolvency procedure

Under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), companies or groups encountering financial difficulties affecting their ability to carry on business can propose a compromise or arrangement (a restructuring plan) which mitigates or eliminates the effects of those financial difficulties.

Der Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) hat am 29. Juni 2023 entschieden, dass ein Rechtsanwalt wegen Beratungsfehlern zu Zahlungen nach Insolvenzreife gegenüber dem Geschäftsführer haften kann, auch wenn er das Unternehmen und nicht die/den Geschäftsführer persönlich berät (IX ZR 56/22, ZInsO 2023, 1642).

The UK Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (CIGA) introduced temporary measures to provide companies with the flexibility to continue trading during COVID-19. CIGA also enacted a package of permanent measures to maximise the survival prospects of viable companies.

The reforms implemented through CIGA are the most significant change to the UK’s corporate insolvency regime in 20 years. This article looks at how those reforms have taken shape over the last three years, with reference to the Insolvency Service's Post-Implementation Review of CIGA.