Piercing the corporate veil (PCV) is a remedy often pursued by a creditor of an insolvent entity against the entity’s parent or principal.  While the corporate veil generally shields a shareholder from the general obligations of his or her corporation, PCV allows a creditor to look beyond the corporate shield and, in certain instances, hold a shareholder liable for the corporation’s debts.

The Federal Court has confirmed that there is no difference between liquidation and deed administration of a corporate trustee in relation to dealings with trust assets and the distribution of proceeds of those assets for the benefit of creditors.

Background

Manpak operated as the trustee for the MP Unit Trust, which carried on the business of a product wholesaler. Under the Trust Deed, Manpak would be disqualified from holding office if it suffered an Event of Default, which included the appointment of an administrator.

The Court of Appeal - Supreme Court of Western Australian has delivered a decision confirming that a statutory set-off under s 553C of the Corporations Act can still be available to a creditor where a general security interest has attached to the amounts it is seeking to set-off (provided those amounts are circulating assets of the insolvent company), whilst leaving the door open for creditors to rely upon set-off rights at general law in those instances where set-off under s 553C is unavailable.

The High Court recently handed down its much anticipated judgment in Mighty River International Limited v Hughes, confirming that deeds of company arrangement which have the effect of extending the administration period can be valid under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act).

Key takeaways

The High Court has refused to grant the Queensland State Government (Qld Government) special leave to appeal the Queensland Court of Appeal’s March 2018 decision in favour of the liquidators of Linc Energy, concerning the liquidators’ obligations to cause Linc Energy to comply with an Environmental Protection Order (EPO).

Federal bankruptcy judges, who are not appointed under Article III of the Constitution, do not have the power to enter a final judgment in all matters that come before them. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), they generally may enter a judgment in all cases under the Bankruptcy Code or in certain proceedings defined as “core proceedings.”

Joining the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that new value does not need to remain unpaid in order to support the subsequent new value defense in a preference action.  See Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), Case No. 17-13588, 2018 WL 3850101 (11th Cir.

To Lease or Not to Lease

In Corporate Claims Management, Inc. v. Shapier, et al. (In re Patriot National Inc.), Adv. Pro. No. 18-50307 (Bankr. D. Del August 8, 2018), the Delaware Bankruptcy Court found that alleged misappropriation of trade secrets could constitute a violation of the automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code and be subject to turnover under section 542 of the Bankruptcy Code. 

InLaMonica v. CEVA Group PLC, et al. (In re CIL Limited), Adversary No. 14-02442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y June 15, 2018), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York was tasked with deciding whether the “collapsing doctrine” could be used to determine the situs of a fraudulent transfer, which was part of an international, multi-step transaction occurring inside and outside of the United States.