Background
Insolvency Practitioners (IPs) commonly adopt time-based costing for the calculation of their remuneration, primarily on the basis that it ensures that the IP is only remunerated for the work actually undertaken and it ensures that remuneration reflects the simplicity or complexity of particular tasks. Three other ways in which remuneration are common calculated are ‘fixed fee’, ‘percentage’ (such as in respect of recoveries/realisations) and ‘contingency’ bases.
The bar for recovering assets that have been dubiously transferred out of an insolvent company may not be as high as one might think.
Background
On 14 June 2016, in its judgment delivered in Great Investments Ltd v Warner [2016] FCAFC 85, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia confirmed that a benefit transferred from a company without authority can only be retained by the recipient in very limited circumstances.
CLIENT PUBLICATION FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING & INSOLVENCY | August 9, 2016 Not So Safe After All?
CLIENT PUBLICATION Financial Restructuring & Insolvency | August 9, 2016 Judge Chapman Flips the Script US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of NY Grants Noteholders’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Lehman’s Failure to State Claim With Respect to Flip-Clause Litigation On June 28, 2016, in what essentially was a clean sweep for the noteholder and trust certificate holder defendants (the “Noteholders”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) granted an omnibus motion to dismiss Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.’s (“LBSF
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
The issue of how causation can be established has been one significant debate in Australian securities class actions involving alleged breaches of the Corporations Act by corporations. It has been unresolved whether shareholders must prove individual reliance on the contravening conduct of companies, or if the conduct affects the market price of shares purchased and/or sold by shareholders is sufficient.
In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.
On March 23, 2016, the European Commission launched a consultation seeking views on key insolvency principles and standards which could ensure that national insolvency frameworks work in a cross-border context. The consultation is part of the Commission’s Capital Markets Union Action Plan which aims to remove barriers to the free flow of capital. Responses will be used to identify which aspects could be included in a legislative initiative or other related actions.
Section 440D imposes a stay on “proceedings in a court” against a company whilst it is in administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. It is well established that the term “proceedings in a court” does not include an arbitration proceeding: see Larkden Pty Limited v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [42] (Hammerschlag J). Notwithstanding this, can the Court use its general power to make orders under s447A to extend the reach of s440D in order to impose a stay on an arbitration against a company in administration?