On March 7, the Spanish government reformed its bankruptcy law to encourage companies to restructure their debt and avoid liquidation. The decree is one part of an ongoing reform program intended to strengthen and stabilize the Spanish financial sector.  The reforms provide stronger incentives for lenders to accept write-offs, maturity extensions, and debt forgiveness for struggling companies. The new rules also reduce the majority of creditors needed to vote for a restructuring.

It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Court of Appeal in Pillar Denton Ltd & Others v (1) Jervis (2) Maddison and (3) Game Retail Ltd ([2014] EWCA Civ 180) yesterday overruled previous High Court authority, deciding that rent should be treated as an expense of the administration based on actual usage and not on when the rent falls due. What does this mean for practitioners?

The background

Landlords will be relieved that the Court of Appeal has closed a legal loophole in a test case arising out of the administration of the Game group of Companies – Pillar Denton Ltd & 5 others v (1) Jervis (2) Maddison (3) Game Retail Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 180.

What happens to funds held in escrow when the paying entity goes into administration?

The background

Escrow mechanisms are familiar territory for most practitioners. The case of Bristol Alliance Nominee No. 1 Ltd and others v Neil Andrew Bennett and others [2013] EWCA Civ 1626 explores what happens when funds are held in escrow at a time when the paying entity goes into administration.

We take a look at the reforms to the EC Insolvency Regulation in light of the European Parliament’s 4 February vote on the committee of legal affairs’ report on the proposed reforms.

The background

Can a debtor be found to be balance sheet or cash flow insolvent even though its obligations are limited (in terms of creditor recourse) to the available assets? This was the question facing the High Court in Re ARM Asset Backed Securities SA [2013] EWCH 3351.

The background

Last Friday, Judge Sleet of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied Hybrid Tech Holdings LLC’s appeal of the Delaware bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. et al, to (i) cap Hybrid Tech’s credit bid for Fisker Automotive’s assets, and (ii) require that the assets be sold via a public auction rather than directly to Hybrid Tech in a private sale.

On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert E.

In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter.