In the case of Domistyle, Inc., 14-41463 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015), the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court requiring a secured creditor to reimburse the trustee for expenses paid to preserve real property subject to the creditor’s lien until the debtor’s eventual surrender of the property to the creditor.

The language of Bankruptcy Code § 501(a) is as broad as it is simple.

The Insolvency Law Reform Bill 2015 has been introduced into Parliament as part of the Australian Government's strategy to modernise and strengthen the nation's insolvency and corporate reorganisation framework.

On November 23, 2015, in the first appellate decision of its kind, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida affirmed a bankruptcy court order to compel chapter 7 debtors to surrender real property by directing the debtors to cease all foreclosure defense. The decision in Failla v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Failla), case no. 15-80328, marks the first decision from a federal appellate court to address the question of whether a bankruptcy court may enter an order directing a debtor to cease defending a mortgage foreclosure suit pending in state court.

Freezing orders and the Foreign Judgments Act

Freezing orders (also known as Mareva orders or Mareva injunctions) are oft-used tools available to a plaintiff to preserve the assets of a defendant, where there is a danger of the defendant absconding or of the assets being removed from the jurisdiction or otherwise diminished. Such dangers put in peril the ability of a plaintiff to recover any favourable judgment against that defendant.

Introduction

The Full Court of the Federal Court has given some important guidance on the calculation of remuneration for court appointed receivers.  In its decision in Templeton v Australian Securities and Investment Commission the Court has highlighted the importance of proportionality in determining reasonable remuneration.

General Position

Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.

In Jenkins v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.,^[1]the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama held that the filing of a proof of claim based on a time-barred debt cannot give rise to a claim for damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), reasoning that any such claim is precluded by the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive claims-allowance procedure.

Foreclosure defense and bankruptcy often go hand in hand, but sometimes it seems like the left hand doesn’t talk to the right. This has proven especially common with bankruptcy plans that propose to “surrender” real property encumbered by a mortgage. The term “surrender” is not defined in the bankruptcy code. As a result, lenders and borrowers often interpret the term differently. For example, most lenders interpret surrender to mean not defending a foreclosure.

On June 1, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, in which all nine Justices joined in an opinion that reversed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that chapter 7 debtors may “strip off” wholly unsecured junior liens. The Caulkett opinion largely relies upon the Supreme Court’s prior decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), in which the Court held that a chapter 7 debtor may not “strip down” liens where the value of the property partially secures the underlying claim.