Under § 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court shall not grant a debtor’s discharge if “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.” To prevail under § 727(a)(3) an objecting party must establish that the debtor has failed to maintain or preserve records.
The Eleventh Circuit has revisited the question of when a debtor may be judicially estopped from pursuing a civil lawsuit due to his or her failure to disclose the claims forming the basis of the lawsuit in their bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect courts against parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.
In Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC, Case No. 15-1945 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a 2-1 decision that filing proofs of claim on time-barred debts does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), at least where state law preserves the right to collect on the payment. In so holding, the court sided with the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals in a circuit split regarding the viability of FDCPA claims premised on proofs of claim filed in a debtor’s bankruptcy case.
The question of who is entitled to payment of compensation for PPI where a debtor has been discharged from his/her Protected Trust Deed (PTD) has given rise to conflicting judicial decisions in Scotland. In our previous article, we highlighted the uncertainty created following the decision of Sheriff Reid in the case of Donnelly v The Royal Bank of Scotland and the decision of Lord Jones in Dooneen Limited, t/a Mcginnes Associates and Douglas Davidson v David Mond.
In March 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a landlord may be liable to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate for the value of a lease the debtor terminated early, holding the termination may be an “avoidable transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.1 The opinion in Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. T.D. Invs. I, LLP (In re Great Lakes Quick Lube LP)2 reversed the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, and in doing so perhaps expanded the definition of a “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code.
Background
In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (the "Act").1 The Act authorized states to create health savings accounts ("HSAs") with taxpreferred treatment to encourage individuals with high-deductible health insurance plans to save for their healthcare expenses.2 Recent data suggests that the popularity of HSA accounts is growing, with one study estimating that the number of HSA accounts rose to 13.8 million in 2014, which is a twenty-nine percent (29%) increase from 2013.
As you may know by now, many of the Official Forms for use in Bankruptcy Courts were replaced with revised, reformatted and renumbered forms that went into effect on December 1, 2015. The changes were made as part of a forms modernization effort that began in 2008 to improve the official bankruptcy forms and the interface between the forms and the courts’ case opening and electronic case management technology.
In Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 15-527 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2016), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined whether a debtor who has been discharged in a bankruptcy can sue in a district court under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), as opposed to seeking relief in the bankruptcy court.
In the case of Domistyle, Inc., 14-41463 (5th Cir. Dec. 29, 2015), the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit affirmed an order of the bankruptcy court requiring a secured creditor to reimburse the trustee for expenses paid to preserve real property subject to the creditor’s lien until the debtor’s eventual surrender of the property to the creditor.
Individuals filing for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") generally do so to have their debts discharged and receive the proverbial "fresh start."2 The same, however, is not true for corporations.