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In Caron and Seidlitz v Jahani and McInerney in their capacity as liquidators of Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) & Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2),[1] the New South Wales Court of Appeal was faced with what it described as the ‘classic insolvency conundrum’: how to distribute funds to investors as equally and as fairly as possible where the funds have

The recently announced proposed insolvency reforms draw on key features from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States and aim to help more small businesses restructure and survive the economic impact of COVID-19.

The reforms will cover around 76% of businesses subject to insolvencies today, 98% of whom have less than 20 employees.[1]

In March, we reported that, as part of a suite of legislative and economic responses to COVID-19 the Commonwealth Government had announced a range of temporary amendments to certain insolvency laws. The amendments were aimed at temporarily amending insolvency laws, affecting in turn corporate governance, and directors’ duties.

In SJG Developments Pty Ltd v NT Two Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq),[1] the Supreme Court of Queensland set aside a statutory demand served by the liquidators of NT Two Nominees Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (NT Two Nominees) on SJG Developments Pty Ltd (SJG). Costs were awarded on the indemnity basis and more significantly, were also ordered against the liquidators personally.

In the recent Gunns decisions, the Federal Court considered three separate unfair preference claims brought by the liquidators of Gunns Limited (in Liquidation) (Gunns) against:

In a case of first impression on the issue of “whether a lease assumption can survive discharge even though it is not reaffirmed[,]” the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that a creditor’s post-discharge attempt to collect the balance owed under an automobile lease assumed by the debtor post-petition but prior to discharge in a Chapter 7 case did not violate the discharge injunction.

Recent changes to the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld) (Act) have simplified the process for mortgagees exercising power of sale and do away with the need for a Court order.

Previously, a mortgagee was required to apply to a Court for a vesting order allowing it to exercise power of sale and to dispense with the requirement to give a Notice of Exercise of Power of Sale to the mortgagor.

Ford (Administrator), in the matter of The PAS Group Limited (Administrators Appointed) v Scentre Management Limited [2020] FCA 1023