Section 37A can be used by future, contingent and prospective creditors to recover assets, meaning the transferor need not be indebted at the time of the transfer.

Recovering assets from a debtor is usually done via the recovery provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) or theBankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), but there is another option, at least in New South Wales, which offers creditors, insolvency practitioners and any prejudiced parties a useful alternative. A recent case demonstrates its advantages (Lardis v Lakis [2018] NSWCA 113; Clayton Utz acted for the successful creditor).

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held that a mortgagee’s foreclosure action did not violate an automatic stay imposed during one of the plaintiff’s chapter 13 bankruptcy schedules, where the debtor failed to amend his bankruptcy schedules to disclose his recent acquisition of the subject property from his son.

In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the mortgagee because father and son plaintiffs were judicially estopped from claiming a stay violation.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently held that a debtor’s claim seeking to use a bankruptcy trustee’s § 544(a) strong-arm power to avoid a mortgage on the ground that it was never perfected did not require appellate review of the state court foreclosure judgment, and therefore was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The two limbs of the defence to an unfair preference claim under section 588FG(1)(b) and (2)(b) of the Corporations Act have separate work to do.

In a useful decision for liquidators and the insolvency industry, the WA Court of Appeal has clarified the nature of the tests creditors need to satisfy to maintain a defence to a liquidator's unfair preference claim in section 588FG(1)(b) or (2)(b) of the Corporations Act (White & Templeton v ACN 153 152 731 Pty Ltd (in liq) & Anor [2018] WASCA 119). 

The U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit recently applied the “conceivable effect” test in holding that a bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over a state law fraud claim raised by a third party regarding the validity of a lender’s lien, and therefore, declined to consider the issue on appeal.

In so ruling, the Panel ruled that the state law fraud claim did not invoke “arising under” or “arising in” jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court because the state law fraud claim was not created or determined by the Bankruptcy Code, and could exist outside of bankruptcy.

The new ipso facto regime applies to all contracts to be entered into on or after 1 July 2018. Businesses should now be carefully reviewing the effect of that regime on their contracts and whether any of their contracts may be exempt under the Corporations Amendment (Stay on Enforcing Certain Rights) Regulations 2018 published on 24 June 2018.

The types of contracts excluded from the new ipso facto stay

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held that a borrower is not entitled to attorney’s fees under the Pennsylvania Loan Interest Law (“Act 6”) relating to an affirmative defense raised in a mortgage foreclosure action that was subsequently discontinued without prejudice.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently held that claim preclusion does not bar a mortgagee from proceeding with a foreclosure complaint despite a prior litigation which resulted in a dismissal with prejudice if the subsequent litigation is based upon a default and acceleration which occurred after the initial foreclosure proceeding.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a party with a pecuniary interest affected by a bankruptcy court order satisfies the “person aggrieved” requirement for appellate standing even where the party fails to appear and object in the bankruptcy proceeding.

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of standing and remanded the case.

The District Court of Appeal for the Fifth District of Florida recently denied a motion to reconsider an order awarding appellate attorney’s fees to borrowers who were the prevailing party on appeal, reversing judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of the mortgagee.