It seems that most bankruptcy decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court involve individual debtors, and the Supreme Court’s latest opinion is no exception. Even though the decision is not in a business bankruptcy case, it examines the bankruptcy court’s powers under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Last Friday, Judge Sleet of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied Hybrid Tech Holdings LLC’s appeal of the Delaware bankruptcy court’s decision in In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. et al, to (i) cap Hybrid Tech’s credit bid for Fisker Automotive’s assets, and (ii) require that the assets be sold via a public auction rather than directly to Hybrid Tech in a private sale.

On January 14, 2014, Judge Robert E.

In a departure from other bankruptcy courts in the Third Circuit and her own recent prior opinion, U.S. Bankruptcy Chief Judge Mary France of the Middle District of Pennsylvania broadly interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 2 (2011), and held that a bankruptcy court lacks the constitutional authority to issue a final judgment in any fraudulent transfer action where the defendant (i) has not filed a proof of claim and (ii) has not consented to the bankruptcy judge entering a final judgment on the matter. 

The Bankruptcy Code provides debtors in possession and other potential plan proponents with considerable flexibility to implement a plan under chapter 11. An important consideration is the preservation of potentially valuable causes of action held by the estate and the provision of a vehicle for post-confirmation prosecution of such claims.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida recently issued an important decision for administrative creditors in chapter 11 cases and chapter 7 cases alike.  In In re National Litho, LLC, 2013 WL 2303786 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a “safe harbor” for certain transfers involving the purchase and sale of securities and protects those transfers from avoidance in bankruptcy proceedings as preferences or constructively fraudulent conveyances.  Specifically, section 546(e) insulates transfers that are “settlement payments” used in the securities trade, as well as other transfers made to or from certain parties, including financial institutions, financial participants and stockbrokers, in connection with a securities contract.  Section 741(8) of the Bankruptcy Code de

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shocked observers by holding that bankruptcy courts have the power to recharacterize claims on account of unpaid debts as equity infusions that cannot be repaid until all creditor claims have been satisfied.  In In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.

Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer made within two years of a bankruptcy filing is fraudulent if the debtor received less than “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer and (i) the transfer rendered the debtor insolvent or was made at a time that the debtor was already insolvent or; (ii) the debtor had an unreasonably small amount of capital; or (iii) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that it would incur, debts that it would be unable to pay as they matured.  The fraudulent transfer laws of most states, made applicable in bankruptcy pro

It isn't law yet, but on December 5, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a significant patent reform bill known as the "Innovation Act." Although the focus of the legislation is on patent infringement litigation and other patent law revisions, the Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, would also make major changes to Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.