Des modifications importantes à la Loi sur la faillite et l’insolvabilité ("LFI") et à la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies ("LACC") entreront en vigueur le 1er novembre 2019 avec l’adoption du projet de loi C-97. Elles auront une incidence importante sur certains aspects des procédures d’insolvabilité entreprises après cette date.
It is well known that a company served with a statutory demand has 21 days to comply. If the recipient fails to pay the amount of the demand (or obtain a court order extending the period for compliance) within the period of 21 days after the demand is served, the creditor may rely on the failure as a basis to apply for the company to be wound up in insolvency. But what if the company pays, or seeks to pay, the amount of the statutory demand after the 21 day period has expired?
Like many areas of insolvency law, statutory demands have strict procedural requirements as to the timing by which documents must be served. But how is the passage of time calculated? If something is required to be done "21 days after" a document is served, is this intended to be inclusive or exclusive of the day the document was served? The Supreme Court of NSW recently grappled with this issue in Verimark Pty Ltd v Passiontree Velvet Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 455 and has provided clarity for lawyers and insolvency practitioners alike.
The decision of the High Court of Australia in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; 261 CLR 132 (Ramsay) clarified the limits of a Bankruptcy Court's discretion to "go behind" a judgment, that is, to investigate whether the underlying debt relied upon for the making of a sequestration order is, in truth and reality, owing to the petitioning creditor. Recently, the Ramsay decision was applied by the Federal Court of Australia in Dunkerley v Comcare [2019] FCA 1002 (Dunkerley).
The ongoing priority dispute between deemed trusts created under federal “fiscal statutes” (being the Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan Act and the Employment Insurance Act) and priming charges arising under restructuring and insolvency legislatio
The Québec Court of Appeal confirmed that unpaid post-filing suppliers, which had neither sought a court-ordered charge to secure their post-filing claims nor availed themselves of their right to stop supplying goods or services to the debtor, cannot claim an implicit priority on the proceeds of sales of assets in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings.
Background: going-concern sales of optometry clinics
The federal government’s budget implementation bill, Bill C-86[1], received Royal Assent on December 14, 2018. An aspect of the budget implementation bill is the amendment of various legislation, including the Patent Act, the Trademarks Act, as part of the government’s implementation of its intellectual property (“IP”) strategy.
In Yukon (Government of) v. Yukon Zinc Corporation, 2019 YKSC 39 (“Yukon Zinc”), the Yukon Supreme Court recently lifted a stay of proceedings imposed in proposal proceedings commenced in British Columbia by Yukon Zinc, a Vancouver-based mining company whose principal asset is the Wolverine Mine in Yukon.
On 19 June 2019, the much-anticipated High Court appeal in the matter of Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2019] HCA 20 (also known as the "Amerind appeal") was handed down.
The Ontario Court of Appeal determines when it is appropriate to vest out a royalty interest as part of an insolvency proceeding
The Importance of the Decision