In a client update released earlier this month, we discussed the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the CCAA proceedings of Indalex Limited. In that case, the Court decided that Indalex’s pension plan wind-up deficiency claims had priority over Indalex’s CCAA secured lender in the context of that case. Of concern is the "chill" that decision may have on secured lending in Ontario to borrowers that sponsor defined benefit pension plans.

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On April 7, 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered a decision in the restructuring proceedings involving Indalex Limited (Indalex) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) that is inconsistent with prior non-binding comments by the same court relating to the priority of certain pension claims. The decision has material implications for institutional financiers that lend against the inventory, accounts receivable or cash collateral of businesses with Ontario regulated defined benefit pension plans and for the access of those businesses to secured credit.

This week, the Ontario Court of Appeal surprised many by deciding that in the context of the CCAA proceedings of Indalex, pension plan deficiency claims can have priority over security held by secured DIP lenders. The Court granted priority for the entire wind-up deficiency of two pension plans over the DIP lender’s security. If not reversed on appeal, the ruling creates a potential worst case scenario for secured lenders in Ontario and could affect availability of credit for all employers who provide defined benefit pension plans for their employees.

On December 16, 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”) reorganization proceedings, the Crown enjoys no super-priority status in relation to its claims for unremitted sales taxes arising under the Goods and Services Tax (the “GST”) or similar provincial sales taxes.

In Ferme CGR Enr, senc (Syndic de) 2010 QCCA 719, the Québec Court of Appeal decided that it is not necessary to put the partners of a Québec general partnership into bankruptcy when the partnership itself is put into bankruptcy. In doing so, the court initially relied upon authorities interpreting the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In addition, the court supported its decision with an analysis of the legal nature of Québec general partnerships and, as a result, modified the ownership structure of partnerships in Québec.

The aggregate costs associated with a formal court-supervised insolvency proceeding can be substantial. In Canada, the obligation to pay these restructuring costs are typically secured by court-ordered charges over all of the property of the debtor and can rank in priority to the liens of secured creditors in the same collateral. As a result, these costs can have a material impact on the ultimate net recovery received by creditors. But how is the burden of these costs shared among secured creditors?

In the recent decision in Re Xerium Technologies Inc.1, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized an order made by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware that confirmed the debtor’s pre-packaged Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The decision provides useful guidance on how the Ontario Court may consider similar applications in the future. Many will take comfort from the fact that the decision revisits a number of relevant factors established in case law that pre-dates the current formulation of the cross-border provisions that make up Part IV of the CCA A.

Cow Harbour Construction Ltd1

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The 2009 amendments to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) (the “CCAA”) and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) codified with some modifications judge made law giving a court authority to grant super-priority priming liens to secure interim financing (or debtorin- possession financing).

An increasing number of restructuring cases involve several creditors with security over varied assets or asset classes. In such cases there is often a dispute over allocation of the costs of the reorganization. This is particularly true in failed restructurings where costs are high and realizations are low.