Background
The plaintiff was the primary trading entity within a larger group of companies which operated a development and construction business.
The liquidation of the group was complex, with a significant number of claims identified as requiring investigation. Further, ASIC’s allegations of serious misconduct resulted in a significant amount of the liquidator’s time being allocated to assisting ASIC with its investigation.
Problem
This article was originally published in the Australian Restructuring, Insolvency & Turnaround Association Journal (Volume 32 #01 2020)
The first of March marked the second anniversary of the changes to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) permitting an external administrator to assign rights to sue. The Australian Government proposed the reform in the hope that the ‘sale of rights of action may enable the value in such rights to be realised’[1].
Recent changes in the Australian regulation of third-party funders will have a dramatic effect on the funding of certain disputes. Although these changes were accompanied by Government and industry commentary that they would not affect litigation funding for insolvency-related claims, this may not be the case for all insolvency funding arrangements.
Singapore confirms further widening of third-party funding options
The United Kingdom and Australia have recently implemented legislative changes to permit external administrators to assign or sell causes of action available to them.
A March 8 2016 decision of the influential Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has attracted attention from – and caused concern for – owners of pipelines and other midstream assets, as well as lenders to midstream and upstream lenders across the United States.
Most due diligence processes in a business acquisition context require a review of material contracts and, in particular, a review of any restrictions on assignment of those contracts.
When a business enters into a long term commercial contract with a customer, the identity of that particular counterparty may influence the terms of the contract. A party deemed more favourable may obtain a better price or better terms. Unless restricted by enforceable anti-assignment provisions, these favourable contracts can be very valuable in a traditional M&A context.