The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in Picard v. Citibank, in which the petitioner sought review of a Second Circuit decision on a seemingly obscure point of law: the pleading burden for “good faith” under Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Second Circuit’s decision is part of, and highlights, a larger, systemic problem in the evolution of bankruptcy law over the last decade—the multiplication of trustee-friendly interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code that, when combined, leave innocent subsequent transferees unfairly vulnerable to meritless clawback suits.
根据测算，截止2022年年初，国内烂尾项目规模已经超过2万亿，随着2021年大型房地产公司接连“暴雷”，势必会产生更多的烂尾或接近烂尾的项目。对于商业逻辑自洽的单体项目破产重组，借助破产清算或重整程序分兵突围势必成为地方政府主导重整的最优路径。但是鉴于目前的房地产市场行情以及烂尾项目续建的特点，大部分重整投资人，尤其是财务投资类型的重整投资人更倾向于采用固定收益的方式进行项目重整，既能实现维护稳定的社会效果，又能最大限度地保证投资安全。因此，如何在当前法律架构下保障固定收益重整投资人的利益是本文中讨论的主要问题。
一 重整投资人的收益模式对比
重整投资人参与烂尾项目的收益模式大致可以分为固定收益模式、风险收益模式和固定加风险收益模式。不同的收益模式下重整投资人有不同的投资逻辑，也有不同的退出模式。我们从投入、收益、风险以及安全性角度对固定收益模式与风险收益模式进行了比较。
（一）固定收益模式
固定收益模式的特点是重整投资人投入重整资金，约定固定收益率，在最终财产变现所得中优先收回投资本金及收益，项目剩余资产全部用于债权清偿。
根据全国人大常委会执法检查组关于检查企业破产法实施情况的报告，党的十八大以来，随着供给侧结构性改革持续深化，加快建立和完善市场主体挽救和退出机制，加之新冠肺炎疫情对于宏观经济运行的深刻影响，我国企业破产案件数量快速上升，2017年至2020年受理和审结的破产案件分别占到《企业破产法》实施以来案件总量的54%和41%。[1]区别于传统的中小企业破产重整，大型或超大型企业集团的资产结构复杂、债务规模巨大、历史遗留问题众多，进入破产重整程序之后，如何在《企业破产法》的框架下实现资产重组与债务清偿、持续运营与杠杆处置、重整效率与债权人保护等多重利益关系的合理平衡，成为破产实务中的难点与痛点。随着2021年B集团实质合并重整案（以下简称“B集团重整案”）和海航集团等三百二十一家公司实质合并重整案（以下简称“海航集团重整案”）中信托计划的引入，破产重整程序中引入信托计划作为新型破产重整模式引起业界关注。本文将结合笔者在破产重整程序中设立信托计划的服务经验，简要介绍破产重整程序中信托计划定位与架构、信托机制与破产重整程序的衔接等相关实务难点问题，以供参考。
一. 破产重整程序中信托计划的概念和优势
On 25 January 2022, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published draft guidance on how it will approach ‘compromises’ by regulated firms. The guidance is expressed to cover restructuring plans, schemes of arrangement and CVAs.
A number of key decisions from the English courts in 2021 illustrate the litigation trends that are likely to have implications for the financial services industry in 2022 and beyond (see below “Cases to watch in 2022”).
Market misconduct and mis-selling
In the first of a series of claims issued by ECU Group Plc in relation to alleged wrongdoing in the foreign exchange markets by a number of banks, the High Court held that:
In Parts 1, 2 and 3 we covered some easy traps to fall into when trying to execute a distressed financing tr
In our last blogpost (here) we reported how the court had, for the first time, exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The facts of this case are set out in more detail in that blogpost.
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New developments regarding Spanish pre-insolvency restructuring tools
14 January 2022
The bill for the Amendment of the Spanish Insolvency Law that transposes Directive 2019/1023 has been published in the Spanish Congress Official Gazette (the Bill), setting out structural reforms in pre-insolvency and insolvency regulations to achieve the following goals:
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Novedades en la Ley Concursal espaola en los procesos de refinanciacin
14 de enero 2022
El Boletn Oficial de las Cortes Generales - Congreso ha publicado el Proyecto de Ley de Reforma de la Ley Concursal que traspone la Directiva 2019/1023 (el Proyecto de Ley) que acomete una reforma estructural en el mbito preconcursal y concursal con numerosas novedades y con los siguientes objetivos:
Summary
For the first time, the court has exercised its power under s. 901C(4) Companies Act 2006 to exclude a company’s members and all but one class of its creditors from voting on a restructuring plan under Part 26A. The court was satisfied that only one class of creditors had a genuine economic interest in the company and noted that “this was not a marginal case”.
Key drivers for the court’s decision (see more detail below) were: