The Bankruptcy Code’s cramdown provisions are a powerful tool for debtors in the plan confirmation process. Pursuant to section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan may be confirmed if, among other things, “at least one class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan.” Once there is an impaired accepting class, and assuming certain requirements are met, the plan may then be “crammed down” on all other classes of impaired creditors that reject the plan and those creditors will be bound by the terms of a plan they rejected.

If you were to walk down Fifth Avenue and see a store displaying a white apple suspended in a large glass case, more likely than not you would immediately think of the California-based tech giant who shares its name with the nutritious snack. Similarly, if the person walking in front of you on your way to the Apple store lifted her heel to reveal a candy-apple red shoe sole, more likely than not the name Christian Louboutin would pop into your head.

Weil Summer Associate David Rybak contributed to this post

2018 has been described as “the year of the CVA”, especially in the retail and casual dining sectors. Although company voluntary arrangements can be a useful tool to compromise portfolios of leasehold obligations, there are certain situations where a CVA may be unsuitable.

1. When a full operational and/or financial restructuring is required

In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit narrowly held that federal law does not prevent a bona fide shareholder from exercising its voting right in the company’s charter to prevent the filing by the company of a bankruptcy petition merely because it is also an unsecured creditor. In re Franchise Servs. of N. Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2018).

In Momentive Performance Materials, the Second Circuit declined to dismiss as equitably moot the appeals of certain noteholders.

Last week, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.1 the Supreme Court settled a split in the circuit courts, unanimously holding that the safe harbor provision created by 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), 11 U.S.C.

It’s been an interesting couple of weeks for bankruptcy at the United States Supreme Court with two bankruptcy-related decisions released in back-to-back weeks. Last week, the Supreme Court issued an important decision delineating the scope of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (discussed here [1] for those who missed it).

On February 16, 2018, the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas issued an opinion that may prove important for non-defaulting parties to trading contracts. In an appeal arising out of the Linn Energy bankruptcy, the district court held that a party seeking to terminate a safe-harbor contract pursuant to section 556 of the Bankruptcy Code is not restricted by any time limitation, and therefore does not waive its safe-harbor rights if it fails to terminate the contract within a certain amount of time.

Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court, in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., Case No. 16-784, ruled that the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, does not shield transferees from liability simply because a particular transaction was routed through a financial intermediary—so-called “conduit transactions.”