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In its most recent precedential bankruptcy decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a claim for breach of contract – even “contingent” or “unliquidated” – is still a claim which can be discharged in a chapter 11 plan. In re Mallinckrodt PLC, No. 23-1111 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2024)

The Supreme Court of NSW refused to validate the appointment of a voluntary administrator (Administrator) to Premier Energy Resources Pty Ltd (Company) under section 447A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) after the Administrator failed to investigate allegations of fraud surrounding his appointment.

As a wise man is wont to say, “Where you stand depends on where you sit.”

This statement applies with full force to the recent, related opinions from Judge Marvin Isgur of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, addressing the effects of a so-called “uptier” liability management transaction.1

Procedurally, Judge Isgur’s rulings denied in part and granted in part motions for summary judgment, permitting certain claims to proceed to trial beginning on January 25, 2024.

The last 12 months have seen a steady increase in restructuring and stressed or distressed financing transactions in the European market across a range of sectors, including tech, real estate, hospitality, manufacturing and retail.

Commonwealth of Australia v Tonks [2023] NSWCA 285

In this decision, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of NSW considered the interplay between the priority regimes under ss 556 and 561 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) in resolving a contest between a liquidator’s claim for remuneration and the entitlements of former employees to be paid out of circulating assets.

The Court of Appeal confirmed the first instance decision of Justice Black in finding that:

When an employer is insolvent and administrators appointed, job losses are often an inevitable consequence. In this blog we look at the legal obligations arising where redundancies meet the threshold for collective consultation, and the implications for administrators arising out of the recent Supreme Court in the case of R (on the application of Palmer) v Northern Derbyshire Magistrates Court and another.

When does the legal obligation to collectively consult apply?