Under § 727(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court shall not grant a debtor’s discharge if “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor’s financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.” To prevail under § 727(a)(3) an objecting party must establish that the debtor has failed to maintain or preserve records.

The Eleventh Circuit has revisited the question of when a debtor may be judicially estopped from pursuing a civil lawsuit due to his or her failure to disclose the claims forming the basis of the lawsuit in their bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect courts against parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.

Shortly after the last ever Monarch Airlines flight landed at Manchester Airport in the early hours of Monday morning, the airline entered administration, prompting the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to launch its "biggest ever peacetime repatriation" to bring home the 110,000 Monarch customers stranded abroad.

The impact on those travellers should be minimal, but an estimated 750,000 customers' future flights and holidays have been cancelled. Where they stand primarily comes down to whether their booking is protected by the UK's Air Travel Organisers' Licence (ATOL) scheme.

The Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims comes into force on 1 October 2017. This note deals with the key elements to be aware of.

Applicability

While the Protocol is named the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims the first thing to note is that it only applies to businesses claiming payment of debts from an individual (including individual sole traders) and does not apply to business-to-business debts.

New Federal Law No. 266-FZ dated 29 July 2017 (the Amendment Law) introduces notable changes to Russia’s insolvency rules. Importantly, the law does away with the original provisions on vicarious liability of controlling persons in RF Law No. 127-FZ on Insolvency of 26 October 2002 (the Insolvency Law). The Amendment Law expands this concept in a series of new clauses. The rules came into force 30 July 2017.

This update deals with “onerous property” and the issues involved when a trustee in bankruptcy disclaims onerous land, including the potential impact on lenders.

Disclaimer of onerous land by a trustee in bankruptcy

At any time, the trustee of a bankrupt estate may disclaim land which is burdened with onerous covenants or is unsaleable or not readily saleable (s 133 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)).

Last year, Burr & Forman lawyers won a decisive victory in the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of In re Failla, 838 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2016). In Failla, the Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor who files a statement of intention to “surrender” his or her house in bankruptcy may not oppose the secured creditor’s foreclosure proceeding in state court. Failla is a significant victory for secured creditors for two primary reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the meaning of “surrender,” as used in 11 U.S.C.

Signed, sealed, delivered, but am I yours? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at least in the context of allowed administrative expense claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The Third Circuit recently considered and ruled in a case as to when goods are deemed “received” for the purposes of determining whether a creditor may recover the value of the goods as an allowed administrative expense claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

LBI EHF (in winding up) v. Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG and Raiffeisen Bank International AG [2017] EWHC 522 (Comm)

In a recent case1 out of the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Florida (the “Court”), a secured creditor moved to dismiss a debtor’s bankruptcy case “for cause” based on the debtor’s bad faith filing.2 The debtor owned certain commercial real estate in south Florida (the “Commercial Property”) and leased space to various tenants, one of which had recently applied for both state and federal licenses to sell medical marijuana.3 The secured creditor had a first-position mortgage on the Commercial Property.4 After a decade-long lending relationship soured, the debtor initiated a len