With the Brexit deadline fast approaching, the ByrneWallace Brexit team address various issues which will impact upon businesses either trading with or through the UK, or with suppliers in the UK, and/or with UK staff based in Ireland or staff in the UK.

In this issue of our Spotlight on Brexit Series, we address Corporate Governance.

Critical issues for businesses to consider in the event of a no-deal Brexit or where transitional arrangements fail to ensure continuity in the treatment of UK companies as EEA undertakings include:

In McFeely v Official Assignee in Bankruptcy [2017] IECA 21, a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Peart on 2nd February 2017, the Court of Appeal has reiterated the importance of maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy process in Ireland, and in so doing has provided a useful overview of the law relating to the circumstances in which the Court will order an extension of the bankruptcy period under the Bankruptcy Act 1988 (as amended) (the “Act”).

Background

Frequently a debtor’s assets are sold out of bankruptcy “free and clear” of liens and claims under §363(f).  While the Bankruptcy Code imposes limits on this ability to sell assets, it does allow the sale free and clear if “such interest is in bona fide dispute” or if the price is high enough or the holder of the adverse interest “could be compelled ... to accept a money satisfaction of such interest” or if nonbankruptcy law permits such sale free and clear of such interest.

On February 5, 2016 the IRS released Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum Number 201606027 (the IRS Memo) concluding that “bad boy guarantees” may cause nonrecourse financing to become, for tax purposes, the sole recourse debt of the guarantor. This can dramatically affect the tax basis and at-risk investment of the borrowing entity’s partners or members. Non-recourse liability generally increases the tax basis and at-risk investment of all parties but recourse liability increases only that of the guarantor.

A long-honored concept in real property, that of “covenants running with the land,” is finding its way into the bankruptcy courts. If a covenant (a promise) runs with the land then it burdens or benefits particular real property and will be binding on the successor owner; if that covenant does not run with the land then it is personal and binds those who promised but does not impose itself on a successor owner.

We are often asked what to do if you have an operating agreement and your operator or one of the other working interest owners files for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to assume or reject the JOA (it is usually an executory contract).

On November 13, 2015, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued Financial Institution Letter 51-2015 (FIL-51-2015), FDIC Seeking Comment on Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Identifying, Accepting and Reporting Brokered Deposits. FIL-51-2015 seeks comments on the proposed updates to the existing FAQ document on brokered deposits, which was initially released in January of 2015 in FIL-2-2015, after additional comments and questions have been received by the FDIC since the initial issuance.

Under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor is permitted to sell substantially all of its assets outside of a plan of reorganization. Over the past two decades, courts have increasingly liberalized the standards under which 363 sales are approved. A recent decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

The Fifth Circuit recently dealt with the interplay of bankruptcy and oil and gas liens in the case of In Re: T.S.C. Seiber Services, L.C., decided November 3, 2014.

The Supreme Court has recently declined to hear retailer Game’s appeal, ruling that there was no arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered, particularly bearing in mind the case had already been the subject of judicial decision and reviewed on appeal.

“… permission to appeal be refused because the application does not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court…”