Under the new liability standard set out in section 64 sentence 3 of the GmbHG, which was introduced by the Act to Modernise the Law Governing Private Limited Companies and to Combat Abuses (MoMiG), the managing director of a company is liable for payments to shareholders which necessarily cause the insolvency of the company. The requirement for causality of the payment for insolvency and actual determination of insolvency were matters of dispute. The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has now established clarity on both points (judgment of 9 October 2012 II ZR 298 / 11).

In a recent decision¹, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found the standard for sealing under § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code was not met and declined to seal a settlement agreement, despite requests from the Chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee") and the counterparties to the settlement agreement to do so. Confidentiality was an essential condition of the settlement. In addition, the United States trustee supported the motion to seal, arguing that the standard for sealing had been met.

Congress enacted the ordinary course of business defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to protect recurring, customary transactions in order to encourage the continuation of business with and the extension of credit to a financially distressed customer.

Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) litigations have sometimes yield "shocking results". There is no pun intended here. This article discusses a recent case where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana waded into the spine tingling issue of whether electricity is a good that is subject to Section 503(b)(9) administrative priority status.

Large businesses and organizations that self-insure their legally mandated insurance requirements often use “fronting” policies in which the policyholder must reimburse insurers for all losses and expenses paid on the policyholder’s behalf. These policyholders must furnish substantial collateral to secure repayment, typically, enough to pay many years’ worth of actual and anticipated claims. This can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, and typically exacerbates cash flow and balance sheet problems for policyholders under financial stress.

Following the entry into force of the Act to Modernise the Law Governing Private Limited Companies and to Combat Abuses (MoMiG), an atypical silent shareholder must still be treated as a subordinate insolvency creditor for the purposes of section 39(1) no. 5 of the Insolvency Act (InsO) in the event that the company becomes insolvent, assuming the status of the silent shareholder is similar to that of a shareholder in a GmbH (private limited company).

In four judgments of 26 June 2012, case refs.: XI ZR 259 / 11, XI ZR 316 / 11, XI ZR 355 / 10 and XI ZR 356 / 10, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has again stated its position on the question of when there is a duty to disclose commission. In all four cases the investors purchased certificates from the same defendant bank to invest different amounts and these certificates turned out to be largely worthless following the insolvency of the issuer (Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V.) and the guarantor (Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.) in September 2008.

In two recent judgments, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) dealt with the resistance to insolvency of the statutory claim for deletion of a land charge and the resistance to insolvency of the claim for restitution of higher or equal ranking land charges which has been assigned for security purposes. Abandoning its existing case law, the BGH answered the question of resistance to insolvency of the statutory claim for deletion from the register as per section 1179a of the German Civil Code in the affirmative in its judgment dated 27 April 2012 (BGH, judgment of 27.04.2012 – V ZR 270 / 10).

In two recent decisions,² the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied motions by large chapter 11 debtors to approve executive bonus plans designated as key employee incentive plans ("KEIP"), finding that the proposed KEIPs actually were disguised and impermissible retention or "pay to stay" bonus plans for insiders. These are the first opinions to reject so-called KEIPs following a recent line of cases that have approved KEIPs for insiders.