The introduction of business rescue proceedings by Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) created uncertainty on various levels, in particular the extent and nature of certain rights previously enjoyed by creditors.

Our courts are making progress in finding a path through the muddy waters in this regard and every day a judgment is delivered that sheds some light on previous uncertain propositions.

In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).

This decision is significant to debt collectors and debt buyers who, according to the dissent, “have ‘deluge[d]’ the bankruptcy courts with claims ‘on debts deemed unenforceable under state statutes of limitations.’”

Introduction

BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.

It is fair to say that not many, if any, banks have internal controls or policies and procedures to identify and mitigate deficiencies in the bankruptcy practices of banks. Indeed, banks typically rely on their Legal Department or external counsel to make sure banks protect their interests when bank customers file bankruptcy. While the Compliance Department and the Risk Management Department track compliance and risks related to numerous laws, rules and regulations, the Bankruptcy Code and its rules are typically not among those laws and rules.

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

The immediate effect of Jevic will be that practitioners may no longer structure dismissals in any manner that deviates from the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of impaired creditors.

In its recent decision in Pars Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and others [2017] SGHC 38, the Singapore High Court held that the security interests of lenders survived the commingling of assets, and that the assets should be divided among the secured lenders in proportion to their respective contributions.

Facts

“Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on the sequestration of the estate of the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards the third party but not exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify the insured” – s156 of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 as amended (Act).