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It is fair to say that not many, if any, banks have internal controls or policies and procedures to identify and mitigate deficiencies in the bankruptcy practices of banks. Indeed, banks typically rely on their Legal Department or external counsel to make sure banks protect their interests when bank customers file bankruptcy. While the Compliance Department and the Risk Management Department track compliance and risks related to numerous laws, rules and regulations, the Bankruptcy Code and its rules are typically not among those laws and rules.

The new Amendment on the Czech Insolvency Act (the “Amendment”) will enter into force on 1 July 2017.

The Amendment introduces a “liquidity gap” test, which will be used when a debtor (entrepreneur) needs to determine whether it is considered insolvent or not. The liquidity gap is the difference between a debtor’s due debts and its readily available funds. A debtor will only be considered insolvent if the liquidity gap is higher than 10% of its overdue debts.

Issue 6 | April 2017 Disputes Digest 2 | Disputes Digest Corporate counsel’s guide to the key cases of 2016 (litigation) Corporate counsel’s guide to the key cases of 2016 (arbitration) Singapore targets effi ciency in investment arbitration proceedings Does the MasterCard class action mark the dawn of a new era in UK litigation?

In Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding, 580 U.S. __(2017), decided on March 22, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without the consent of impaired creditors, a bankruptcy court cannot approve a "structured dismissal" that provides for distributions deviating from the ordinary priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code. The ruling reverses the decisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, and the U.S.

The immediate effect of Jevic will be that practitioners may no longer structure dismissals in any manner that deviates from the priority scheme of the Bankruptcy Code without the consent of impaired creditors.

In its recent decision in Pars Ram Brothers (Pte) Ltd (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) v Australian & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and others [2017] SGHC 38, the Singapore High Court held that the security interests of lenders survived the commingling of assets, and that the assets should be divided among the secured lenders in proportion to their respective contributions.

Facts

Last year we reported on a decision of the Scottish Court of Session which suggested that greater leniency may apply to the interpretation of performance bonds in Scotland than in England (see our earlier Law-Now here). A further decision from the Court of Session issued last month would appear to support this trend.

Fife Council v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance plc

Administrators can be validly appointed to a company by the holder of a floating charge which was given by the company in breach of a negative pledge in favour of an existing secured creditor and even if, both at the time of the purported creation of that floating charge and on the day of the purported appointment of administrators, the company had no assets which were the subject of the floating charge.

The United States Bankruptcy Code, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b)(6), caps a landlord's claim in bankruptcy for damages resulting from the termination of a real property lease. See In re PPI EnterprisesU.S., 324 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2003). Under Section 502(b)(6), a landlord-creditor is entitled to rent reserve from the greater of one lease year or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the remaining lease term.

Recently, in a split (2-1) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 111 F. Supp.3d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Marblegate II”). The Second Circuit held in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., No. 15-2124, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 782 (2d Cir. Jan.