A New York bankruptcy court recently rejected a debtor’s challenge to a consensual state court judgment (“Judgment”) in favor of mortgagee, General Electric Capital Corporation (“GECC”), that had accelerated a debt and obtained a prepetition foreclosure judgment against debtor, 410 East 92nd Street (the “Hotel”), in the amount of approximately $74 million. In re: Madison 92nd St. Associates LLC, 472 B.R. 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
The Government must provide actual notice of forfeiture proceedings to those the Government knows have claimed an interest in property to be forfeited. In a fact pattern the Sixth Circuit characterized as "befitting a John Grisham novel," the Government dug up (literally) a fraudster’s $250,000 on a golf course. The Government found the money in October 2009 and instituted forfeiture proceedings. In November and December 2009, the Government posted a generalized notice of forfeiture on the internet.
The Delaware bankruptcy court in the KB Toys, Inc. cases recently held that a claims purchaser takes a claim subject to certain disabilities of the claim as held by the seller, regardless of whether the claim transfer is deemed a “sale” or an “assignment.” SeeIn re KB Toys, Inc., Case No. 04-10120 (KJC) (Bankr. Del. May 4, 2012). In so ruling, the Delaware court’s decision is somewhat at odds with the decision issued by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in the Enron bankruptcy cases. See Enron Corp. v.
After several years of unusually few corporate defaults, there has recently been an uptick in corporations failing to satisfy their bond and loan obligations. In a number of cases, the debts in question are part of multiple-lien or multi-tranche financing structures that incorporate complex subordination packages. The agreements at issue often go beyond merely subordinating rights to payments.
It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) filed an objection on June 14, 2012, in the Delaware bankruptcy court proceedings of RG Steel ("Debtor"), challenging a recent sale by RG Steel's parent entity ("Parent") of a 25-percent ownership stake in the Debtor. If the sale is respected, Parent would fall outside of the Debtor's "controlled group" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), with the result that Parent may cease to have joint liability for the Debtor's unfunded pension obligations.
It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?
In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court recently handed down a decision dealing with the constitutionality of one of the timeframes set by the Bankruptcy Law for filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings.
Where an insured has assigned away its rights to recover available insurance, the insured’s “empty shoes” do not necessarily prevent an excess carrier that pays defense costs rightfully owed by primary carriers from pursuing the primary carriers based a contractual subrogation theory. An excess carrier proceeding on this basis typically “stands in the shoes of the insured,” obtaining only those rights held by the insured. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found last week that where an excess carrier picks up the bill for an insured’s defense, it may recover fr