Since at least the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2007 landmark decision in N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.

The unitranche financing market has expanded significantly in recent years. Generally, a unitranche deal involves two lenders (or groups of lenders) that provide financing on a “first out” and “last out” basis. In conjunction with the financing, the borrower grants one lien and enters into a single credit agreement and the lenders enter into an “Agreement Among Lenders” (“AAL”). An AAL is similar to an intercreditor agreement and provides for certain rights and remedies of the lenders.

The recent case of APCOA Parking1 has set a precedent by allowing yet more non-English incorporated debtors to implement financial and corporate restructurings using English schemes of arrangement.

Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code limits the ability of a trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid as a constructive fraudulent transfer or preferential transfer a transaction in which the challenged settlement payment was made through a stockbroker or a financial institution.1 Because of the broad protection granted by section 546(e) – the so-called “safe harbor” provision – parties structuring a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) or similar transaction often ensure that settlement funds flow through one of the listed institutions to inoculate the beneficiaries from a later challenge as a constr

I. Introduction

On 21 June 2013 Italy issued a new emergency decree (Law Decree No. 69 of 21 June 2013, which entered into force on 22 June – the "2013 Decree") introducing a number of provisions aimed at fostering the economy and attracting foreign investments.¹

Certain provisions of the 2013 Decree amend the Bankruptcy Act² by introducing rules aimed at avoiding abuses and increasing transparency.

I. Introduction

On April 22, 2013, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re School Specialty upheld the enforceability of a make-whole premium triggered by the pre-petition acceleration of a secured term loan.1 The decision re-affirms that bankruptcy courts will respect properly drafted make-whole premiums that pass muster under applicable state law.

The Illinois Supreme Court recently provided certainty to dissolving corporations with respect to the risk of facing a lawsuit even after it has long since dissolved. Illinois permits lawsuits against dissolved corporations for up to five years after the corporation has ceased to exist. The Supreme Court clarified that only those claims that have accrued prior to the corporation's dissolution (i.e., the injury occurred prior to dissolution) may be brought in that five-year period.

The 7th Circuit has again left a disappointed creditor with no recourse because of the creditor's failure to do basic investigation or take steps to protect itself. (On Command Video Corporation vs. Samuel J. Roti, Nos. 12-1351 and 12-1430, January 14, 2013). This case follows other cases in which the 7th Circuit has shown itself decidedly unfriendly to creditors who sought compensation through the courts in failed business ventures but could have, but failed, to prevent their unfortunate situation.

When being sued, corporate and individual defendants should always confirm that the plaintiff has not been previously discharged in bankruptcy and failed to disclose the claim in the proceeding as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. In Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012), the plaintiff brought numerous claims against various governmental entities, governmental officials and a police officer.