T he recent—and unexpected—rejection by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the modified plan of reorganization of Washington Mutual, Inc. (“WaMu”)2 on the ground of a “colorable claim” of insider trading has raised questions about the standards of conduct for members of ad hoc creditors committees during corporate reorganizations.3 In WaMu, Judge Mary F.
The UK Supreme Court, which is the UK's highest court, has handed down its long-awaited decision in Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc [2011] UKSC 38, in which the Court considered the validity and enforceability of so-called "flip" clauses under English bankruptcy law.
On January 25, 2010, United States Bankruptcy Court Judge James M. Peck issued a decision that limited the ability of parties to swap transactions to enforce certain of their contractual rights against a counterparty that has filed for bankruptcy. See Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd.1 (the “BNY Decision”).
The Australian unit trust industry recently experienced financial difficulties. The formal legal process of handling those difficulties has revealed gaps in the Australian regulatory map.
This article highlights some of those problems and the Government’s response to them.
Background
Few now remember that Chapter 5C of the Corporations Act can trace its origins to the afternoon of 23 July 1991. For the past year, the unlisted property trust industry had been in meltdown. The value of the assets held by the industry had fallen over 20%. Investors were scrambling to get out, and collapses seemed imminent.
In insolvency circles, the word "success" is definitely a relative term. Often it only means that a complete meltdown of the company's business has been averted, or that employees have at least received their statutory entitlements on their way out the door.
The ABC Learning Centre story has, however, definitely been a success by any measure – including some measures which are not generally part of the metrics of insolvency.[1] In order to see why this insolvency administration deal was both unique and uniquely successful, it is necessary to understand some of the background.
In the recent case of Dwyer & Ors and Davies & Ors v Chicago Boot Co Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 27, Chicago Boot claimed that certain payments made to it by two insolvent companies were not unfair preference payments, because of, amongst other defences, the purported application of a retention of title clause in relation to the supply of goods by Chicago Boot.
On April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court approved certain amendments to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 requiring disclosures by certain creditors and equity holders in Chapter 11 cases. We expect that amended Rule 20191 (“Amended Rule 2019”) will take effect as a matter of law on December 1, 2011 unless in the interim Congress enacts legislation to reject, modify, or defer the rules, which we view as unlikely.
On April 25, 2011, as widely expected, a group of Lehman creditors holding claims arising from terminated derivatives transactions filed a competing plan of reorganization and related disclosure statement in the Debtors' chapter 11 cases. As a result of the new filing, there are now three competing plans – (1) the Debtors’ Plan, (2) the Ad Hoc Group’s Plan (filed by a group of bondholder creditors) and (3) the Non-Consolidation Plan (filed by the derivative claimants) - in the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings.
Your insurer goes bust – can you as an insured claim the reinsurance proceeds? An important decision in the NSW Supreme Court gives useful guidance on when a court will allow departures from the statutory scheme controlling the application of reinsurance proceeds (Amaca Pty Ltd v McGrath & Anor as liquidators of HIH Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 90).
The insurer goes broke, and there are all these claimants at the door…