The recent steady drumbeat of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings is producing an equally persistent corollary: creditors receiving new securities issued by the reorganizing debtor or a related party in full or partial satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. Some of these creditors-cum-investors never planned to receive securities. The paradigmatic example is a creditor that enters into a normal business transaction resulting in an obligation that the debtor company hasn’t yet satisfied when it files for reorganization.

On 4 March 2009, the Office of Public Sector Information published the Bank Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2009 (the Rules) and accompanying explanatory memorandum. The Rules came into force on 25 February 2009 and give effect in England and Wales to the new bank insolvency procedure under Part 2 of the Banking Act 2009.

Liquidators will welcome the recent decision of the Director of Corporate Enforcement to reduce their reporting requirement in cases where a decision has been definitively made either to relieve or not relieve them of their statutory obligation to take restriction proceedings against a company's directors.

Nothing is certain in today's financial crisis - except that the legal system will be sorting out the rights and obligations of financial market participants for years to come. This is especially true for participants in the over-the-counter derivatives markets.

This memorandum provides an overview of the practical issues facing a sub-participant under a Loan Market Association ("LMA") English-law governed sub-participation agreement as the creditworthiness of grantor deteriorates.

Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.

A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.

Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.