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In its judgment in Haine v Sec of State for BERR and the liquidator of Compounds Section Ltd the Court of Appeal has decided an important question on employer insolvency.

Boards of directors of troubled companies must balance their fiduciary obligations to shareholders and creditors. Insolvent companies owe duties to creditors and not solely to shareholders and, under evolving case law, companies acting in the "zone of insolvency" owe a duty to creditors as well as to shareholders.

The rapid growth in derivatives as hedging instruments, particularly through equity swaps, credit default swaps ("CDS") and loan credit default swaps ("LCDS"), has challenged fundamental assumptions underlying corporate governance law, federal shareholder disclosure requirements and bankruptcy law. Corporate law has long relied on a "one share one vote" model, which presumes that a shareholder's economic interests in a corporation are inextricably linked to their voting power.

In Dynamex Friction Ltd v Amicus an administrator had dismissed the entire workforce immediately on being appointed because the company had no money to pay its debts. At that time no transferee of the insolvent business had been identified and there was no prospect of a sale. However, the administrator did shortly afterwards agree a sale of the remaining company assets to a newly formed purchaser company that had links with the directors of the ‘old’ company.

We have written in the past about the risks to investors in troubled companies from trustees in bankruptcy seeking recoveries for the estate on theories such as insider trading, breaches of duty and conflicts of interest. While those risks remain real, a recent decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals should provide some restraint on bankruptcy trustees.

A recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation, et al. ("Delphi") bankruptcy case calls into question the effectiveness of power of attorney provisions found in many claim purchase agreements. Specifically, on February 26, 2008, United States Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain, presiding over the Delphi bankruptcy proceeding, held that claims purchasers could not submit cure notices in reliance on powers of attorney.

Delphi Sent Cure Notices Only to Contract Counterparties

Owners of bank loan participations take on two kinds of credit risk: (i) the borrower’s failure to pay the underlying bank loan, and (ii) the loan participation grantor’s bankruptcy. The first risk is well understood and carefully analyzed in each transaction. This memorandum focuses on the second kind of credit risk assumed by a participant -- grantor insolvency.

Recently, a number of high profile cases have emerged involving the application of material adverse change ("MAC") provisions, primarily in the context of leveraged buyouts.2 This week, the application of MAC clauses to a financing commitment arose in the context of the Solutia Inc. ("Solutia") bankruptcy proceeding. On February 6, 2008, Solutia filed an adversary proceeding against certain lenders (the "Lenders")3 seeking to enforce a commitment to provide $2 billion in exit financing.

Following a recent ruling in the Delphi Corporation bankruptcy case approving cure notices and cure claims procedures, purchasers of unsecured trade claims originating out of executory contracts or unexpired leases should take special precautions to protect their rights or risk impairment or loss of such claims to the extent they become cure claims.

The Commission has opened a formal investigation under EC Treaty state aid rules into a series of aids amounting to €40.7 million that Italy intends to grant to Legler S.p.A, a denim textile producer. The Commission doubts at this stage that the restructuring plan of Legler S.p.A. would restore the beneficiary's commercial viability and is concerned that the aid would create undue distortions of competition in this highly competitive market. The opening of the formal investigation gives interested parties an opportunity to comment on the proposed measures.